Geographical information plays a permanently increasing role in our society. More and more devices and applications use and process geographical information to serve all kinds of purposes. Smartphones, cars, e-bikes, scooters or foot shackles for law enforcement purposes collect and process geographical information on a permanent basis. Here, we take a close look at privacy issues and the data protection perspective, namely considering the European GDPR and experiences gained one year after its entry into effect.

An extensive range of today’s applications on all sorts of devices are based on geographical information and therefore geolocation data. Think of map apps or popular dating apps, social networks and messenger apps containing whereabout and geotagging functionalities. Geographical information is regularly collected from all of us, playing an important role in our daily lives. It is therefore critical to clarify the legal framework applicable to hardware, software, applications and services equipped with or based on data generated by location-sensitive sensors.This article describes the data protection perspective, particularly considering the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and experiences gained in the year since its entry into effect. Many of the devices and applications generating or using geographical information are intimately linked to a specific individual. Most people keep their smartphone and similar devices very close to themselves, from the breakfast table to their pocket or handbag, to the workplace, to the bedside table. Cars, e-bikes, or scooters accompany people on their daily commute and during business or recreational travel.

 

Geolocation makes it possible to obtain all types of information in real time and locate the user with pinpoint accuracy at any given point in time, from any device connected to the Internet. This allows manufacturers of devices and providers of geolocation-based services to gain a very intimate and accurate overview of user habits and patterns. They can build extensive profiles, and even to link such profile information to all kinds of other information. Such profiles may also include highly sensitive categories of data, such as information about visits to specialized physicians or hospitals, religious or cultural places, or political demonstrations. Profiles can easily be used to prepare and make decisions that significantly affect the individual in an unprecedented form and manner.

Such constant and extensive monitoring, analytics, use and dissemination of location data generates unpredictable risks, not only for individuals concerned, but to an equal extent for service providers facing potential attacks and data breaches, and in the sequence of events, possible sensitive punitive measures by supervisory authorities. Such risks increase exponentially due to rapid technical progress and largely unhindered commercial exploitation. Particular attention must be paid to risks connected with monitoring carried out secretly, without properly informing the individual concerned. Many users ignore or “forget” that location data processing or even location services are switched on or are performing as “background applications.” To ensure a legal framework to mitigate such risks and define ways for companies to use such data, the GDPR established a framework for processing personal data, including geolocation data.

GDPR Impact on Geolocation Information

The GDPR Regulation (EU) 2016/679 became applicable throughout the entire European Union on May 26, 2018. It has a major impact on data protection discussions worldwide. Originally conceived as an instrument for further harmonizing the different data protection standards of EU member states, the GDPR has such a broad scope of application that its influence extends far beyond EU borders. It may be applicable for companies in third countries, even if such companies do not have any establishment within the EU.

General Principles of the GDPR

The GDPR sets the legal framework for businesses located within the EU processing personal data, ensuring a high level of data protection. The GDPR’s basic principles stipulate that the processing of personal data must be lawful, fair and transparent, carried out with a strict purpose limitation, based on the principle of data minimization, and always ensuring appropriate security (Art. 5 (1)).

Foremost, the rights of individuals (called data subject — an identified or identifiable natural person whose personal data are processed) have been harmonized, renewed and extended. The right of access to one’s own personal data (Art. 15) does not only include the right to information on such data, but also the right to request an electronic copy. The right to deletion enforces the corresponding controller’s obligation to minimize data processing, once the purposes for processing are accomplished. The data subject also has a right to object to the processing of the data, which is to be complied with without limitations for direct marketing purposes (Art. 21).

To observe the data subject’s rights and provide a proper protection of personal data, suitable technical and organizational measures, not only on IT security, are to be adopted. Such measures must be updated regularly according to the current state of the art in IT technology.

Tackling the risks, mentioned earlier, of unintentional or even secret data collection, the principle of privacy by design and default was prioritized (Art. 25). This requires proof by the controller that no more personal data than necessary for each specific purpose are processed, and that personal data is not made accessible by default if not required. This is particularly relevant for geolocation data, which should only be collected when specifically required for the purposes requested by the data subjects.

The conditions for violations of the GDPR have been considerably strengthened, with fines up to 20 million EUR (approximately $22.21 million), or in the case of a company group, up to 4% of the total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial year (Art. 83 (3)). However, it should be noted that such high fines will only be imposed in cases of severe GDPR breaches.

Personal Data, GDPR Applicability Defined

The GDPR’s definition of personal data includes all information relating to an identified or identifiable living natural person. Personal data within the scope of the GDPR therefore includes device IDs, location data, browser types, IP addresses, etc.

While (online) identifiers (e.g. user ID, IP address, etc.) are not considered personal identifiable information, since they alone cannot be used to identify a person, the GDPR considers it sufficient that any entity may identify a person, irrespective of the fact that a link between the “de-identified” information and the identifying information may only be created in the most aggravated circumstances. Therefore, even if the controller itself does not own or does not have access to the identifying information, the data can still be considered personal data if any other entity may identify the person based on the information held. As an example, telecommunications companies and website operators can establish a clear link to the customer via the IP address of a person and therefore may establish a connection between IP address and username. Therefore, the IP address and other similar identifiers constitute personal data, according to the GDPR.

If data is pseudonymized–all identifiable characteristics are replaced by identifiers–such data can still fall under the term personal data as used in the GDPR, if such data can be used for the renewed identification of persons.

Anonymized data are neither personal identifiable information nor personal data. Such data must however be processed in a way so that they cannot be traced back to a natural person. This may for example be the case for financial data, statistical data for data used for research purposes.

Territorial Scope of the GDPR

The scope of the GDPR can also affect companies located outside the EU, including in the U.S. Companies fall into the territorial scope of the GDPR if personal data are processed either by “an establishment of a controller or a processor in the Union, regardless of whether the processing takes place in the Union or not” (Art. 3 (1)). Therefore, the GDPR is applicable if a foreign company has a branch in Europe which processes personal data. Even renting of office space or having an individual representative within the EU can constitute an “establishment.”

Even companies with no establishment in the EU may fall under the GDPR’s territorial scope, as all companies that offer goods or services in the EU or observe the behavior of EU citizens are subject to the GDPR (Art. 3 (2)). The definitions of goods and services are not to be interpreted restrictively: it is enough to obviously intend to offer services in one (or more) EU member states.

While the mere accessibility of a website in the EU is not enough, price labeling in local currency (e.g. EUR) or websites in local language (e.g. French or German) may indicate the intended provision of goods and services in the EU. Lastly but very importantly, any activity linked with behavioral monitoring of EU data subjects opens the GDPR’s applicability.

Thus, the GDPR applies in many cases where a company, due to its location, would not generally assume its applicability. As a direct consequence, the processing activities falling under the territorial scope of the GDPR have to comply with the GDPR and the respective entity has to designate in writing a representative in the EU (Art. 27 (1)).

Lawfulness of Processing Personal Data

The processing of personal data is only lawful if occurring on an explicit legal basis. Otherwise, such data processing is prohibited. A legal basis can either derive from the data subject’s free consent or from an explicit statutory permission.

In practice, the most relevant legal basis for the processing of personal data derives from the controller´s legitimate interests (Art. 6 (1) sentence 1 lit. f). The question as to the existence of legitimate interests must be answered by a balancing of interests: the legitimate interest of the controller on the one hand and the opposing interests of the data subject on the other. In principle, the definition of a legitimate interest covers any legal, factual or economic interest. This is the case, for example, where “there is a relevant and appropriate relationship between the data subject and the controller in situations such as where the data subject is a client or in the service of the controller” (Recital 47).

Further, a contractual relationship between the controller and the data subject (not: the data subject’s employer) constitutes a legal basis for all data processing which is necessary for the performance of such contractual relationship (Art. 6 (1) sentence 1 lit. b GDPR). The concept of “necessity” may not be interpreted too strictly; processing is already necessary for the performance of the contract if no less incisive, economically equally efficient means are available.

Furthermore, the controller can only rely on the consent given by the data subject. If, for example, the provider of a navigation software compiles profiles on the movement of its customers for personalized marketing activities, such processing will generally require consent. A consent to data processing must be given freely, unequivocally and with full knowledge of all background information about the data processing of the data subject´s personal data. Thus, full disclosure of the processing activities is key for obtaining valid consent.

Since the legal basis (or rather the purposes of processing) cannot be exchanged at one’s own discretion, it is important to identify and lay down the explicit purpose and the respective legal basis for every processing activity upfront. The processing activities must then be designed in such a way that they comply with the conditions set out in the respective provisions of the GDPR. The processing of geolocation data will require the consent of the data subject in most cases. When basing such processing on legitimate interests, a clear information to the data subject, with proof that it was given, will be required.

Data Protection Impact Assessment

To avoid uncontrollable risks for the data subject’s vital interests and rights, manufacturers and service providers must ensure compliance with the GDPR. Alongside the controller’s obligations to implement technical and organizational measures to assure such compliance, the GDPR establishes dedicated compliance instruments. Namely, controllers can be obliged to perform a data protection impact assessment (DPIA) prior to the start of data processing (Art. 35). The DPIA evaluates the risks arising from the planned processing activities. Such assessment obligation is new and did not exist before the GDPR.

The controller’s obligation to perform the assessment applies “where a type of processing in particular using new technologies, and taking into account the nature, scope, context and purposes of the processing, is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons” and is understood to be required “in case of systematic and extensive evaluation of personal aspects which is based on automated processing, including profiling, and on which decisions are based that produce legal effects concerning the natural person or similarly significantly affect the natural person” or when “processing on a large scale of special categories of data” is carried out.

Data protection impact assessments may have significant impact on the processing activities and should therefore be conducted carefully with involvement of all relevant internal stakeholders (e.g. management, commercial, data protection officer, IT) and external expertise.

Conclusion

Geolocation devices, applications and services are pervasive in an “always connected” world. They have introduced innumerable innovative, profitable and functional services and applications. With location technology, a user’s experience can be uniquely personalized, and user data can be evaluated and processed in a way that was not imaginable a few years ago. This appeals to all types of companies in the digital economy, as well as law enforcement, other public agencies and, unfortunately, criminals.

Compliance with the GDPR is mandatory for all companies falling under its scope, but such compliance can also provide key competitive advantages to other companies. Many countries are preparing for adjustments of the national law according to the European standards, while customers and business partners are increasingly being sensitized to the issue of data protection.

Manufacturers of devices producing geolocation data and services providers processing or using such geolocation data should retain the following:

• Companies basically fall into the territorial scope of the GDPR if:

• their headquarters is located within the EU,

• they have a branch which processes personal data in the EU,

• they offer their goods or services in the EU or

• monitoring of a data subject takes place within the EU.

• The GDPR has a broad definition of personal data. Personal data include all information relating to an identified and even identifiable and living person.

• Once the GDPR is applicable, all its requirements must be met.

• The GDPR’s key requirements regarding geolocation data include:

• Assignment of a data protection officer and, in the case of a company not located in the EU, the designation of a representative in the EU;

• Observance of data subject´s rights (such as Information and data deletion);

• IT Security measures;

• Appropriate safeguards concerning data protection in contracts with service providers;

• implementing and updating a record of data processing activities;

• being able to proof data privacy by design and default;

• performance of data protection impact assessments (if applicable).

The main questions in order to assess on one’s own data protection compliance regarding geolocation data are:

• Are data processed within the EU or do processing activities affect EU citizen data?

• What location data are collected and how are they used?

• Are profiles obtained or derived out of data sets?

• What are the purposes of specific data processing activities?

• What is the legal basis for such data processing?

• Are special categories of personal data (Art. 9 (1)) processed?

• Are appropriate safeguards and technical and organizational measures in place?

• Which information obligations are to be met and how?

• Is there an obligation to perform a data protection impact assessment regarding certain processing activities of geolocation data?

Compliance with the GDPR, if it applies to a company´s activities, is a legal obligation, and non-compliance can lead to severe consequences. Even if compliance with the GDPR is not “legal witchcraft,” it requires awareness and legal expertise in the company. External expertise may be useful to get the process started.

Additional Resources

(1) Text of the GDPR in the current version (all languages): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/DE/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016R0679

(2) GDPR guidelines, recommendations and best practices, issued by the European data protection board (edpb): https://edpb.europa.eu/our-work-tools/general-guidance/gdpr-guidelines-recommendations-best-practices_en

(3) First overview on the implementation of the GDPR and the roles and means of the national supervisory authorities, issued by the edpb: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/plmrep/COMMITTEES/LIBE/DV/2019/02-25/9_EDPB_report_EN.pdf

(4) Opinion 13/2011 on Geolocation services on smart mobile devices, issued by the former Article 29 Data Protection Working Party of 16 May 2011: https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2011/wp185_en.pdf

Authors

Dr. Philip Lüghausen is partner at BHO Legal since January 2019. His practice primarily focuses on data and data protection law with a special focus on scientific and commercial R&D, IT law, E-comm

The post GNSS & The Law: Collecting and Processing Geolocation Data appeared first on Inside GNSS - Global Navigation Satellite Systems Engineering, Policy, and Design.

The maritime sector drives the global economy, with ships transporting more than 80% of world trade. Ships and ports have come to rely on global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) for a huge array of applications relating to position, velocity and precise universal and local time.

It is perhaps not surprising that the fallout from GNSS failure in the maritime sector over a five day-period could cost GBP£1.1billion in lost gross value added (GVA) in the United Kingdom alone (or about 1.4 billion USD) – according to a recent study by London Economics, commissioned by Innovate UK, the UK Space Agency and the Royal Institute of Navigation. [For more on this study, see Brussels View in the July/August 2017 issue of Inside GNSS.]

The threat of GNSS disruption to ships themselves is a real one. GPS interference in the Black Sea was reported earlier this year, affecting as many as 20 ships. And the United States Coast Guard warned that a sudden loss of GPS signal had occurred on multiple outbound vessels from a non-US port in 2015. Loss of GPS input to the ship’s surface search radar, gyro units and Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS), resulted in a lack of GPS data for position fixing, radar over ground speed inputs, gyro speed input and loss of collision avoidance capabilities on the ECDIS radar display.

However, ships do not rely on just GNSS alone for position fixing. A shipmaster can also deploy radar, or cross bearings using compass; terrestrial radio navigation; even sextants. This allows ships to mitigate the impact of GPS disruption.

Regulations in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) require merchant ships to carry a receiver for a GNSS or a terrestrial radionavigation system, or other means, suitable for use at all times throughout the intended voyage to establish and update the ship’s position by automatic means. But they must also carry a compass, a device to take bearings, and backup arrangements for ECDIS.

The organization which oversees SOLAS and has the remit for adopting carriage requirements, operational requirements and performance standards for world shipping is the International Maritime Organization (IMO). IMO (originally known as the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, or IMCO) is the United Nations specialized agency with responsibility for developing the regulations for ship safety and maritime security, and the prevention of pollution from ships.

IMO does not operate GNSS systems, but has an important role in accepting and recognizing worldwide radionavigation systems which can be used by international shipping.

When IMO began its work as the international regulatory body for shipping in 1959, one of its first tasks was to adopt a revised SOLAS treaty, to update the 1948 SOLAS treaty. (The very first SOLAS treaty was adopted in 1914, in the wake of the Titanic disaster, while another version was adopted in 1929.)

When the 1960 SOLAS was adopted by IMO, terrestrial radio navigation systems – including Decca Navigator and Loran A – were already in operation. In these systems, a ship’s radio receiver would measure transmissions from groups of radio transmitters sending signals simultaneously or in a controlled sequence. By measuring the phase difference between one pair of transmissions a line of position can be established. A second measurement, from another pair of stations, gives a second line and the intersection of the two lines gives the ship’s position.

In its chapter V on Safety of Navigation, SOLAS 1960 included a requirement for ships over 1,600 gross tonnage on international voyages to be fitted with radio direction-finding apparatus – a requirement dating back to the 1948 SOLAS Convention. The apparatus was required to comply with system requirements set out in SOLAS chapter IV on Radiotelegraphy and Radiotelephony (SOLAS Chapter IV is now called Radiocommunications).

By the late 1960s and early 1970s, Loran C and Differential Omega radio navigation systems were also becoming operational in major areas of the world’s oceans and they were combined with early computer technology to provide electronic printouts of the ship’s position. The then-Soviet Union’s Chayka system also became operational.

During this time, IMO Member States increasingly recognized the importance of using navigation systems in maritime safety and preventing marine pollution, for example as an aid to avoiding hazards. In 1968, IMO recommended that ships carrying oil or other noxious or hazardous cargoes in bulk should carry “an efficient electronic position-fixing device” (Assembly resolution A.156(ES.IV) Recommendation on the Carriage of Electronic Position-Fixing Equipment).

IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee was also noticing the potential for accurate position finding which satellites could provide. As with other developments in technology with shipping applications, IMO’s concern was to ensure that the user would benefit from the new technology and that such new systems would at least meet agreed performance standards.

A recommendation on accuracy standards for navigation, adopted by the IMO Assembly in 1983 (resolution A.529(13)), provided “guidance to Administrations on the standards of navigation accuracy for assessing position-fixing systems, in particular radionavigation systems, including satellite systems”. Outside harbour entrances and approaches, the order of accuracy was set at “4% of distance from danger with a maximum of 4 nautical miles”.

This was a fairly moderate requirement compared to today’s systems.

The Maritime Safety Committee had, in the meantime, begun to consider whether ships should be required – on a mandatory basis – to carry means of receiving transmissions from a suitable radio navigation system throughout their intended voyage.

A study was initiated to look at the operational requirements (including the need for reliability and low user cost) and how such systems could be recognized or accepted by IMO.

The Report on the study of a World-Wide Radionavigation System was adopted by the IMO Assembly in 1989 (resolution A.666(16)). It gave a detailed summary of the different terrestrial-based radio navigation systems then in operation (Differential Omega, Loran-C, Chayka), and also the satellite systems in development. These were the Global Positioning System (GPS) (United States) and GLONASS (Global Navigation Satellite System) (then Soviet Union – now under the Russian Federation). It was agreed that IMO would develop performance standards for GPS and GLONASS receivers.

The study concluded that it was not feasible for IMO to fund a worldwide radio navigation system. However, IMO’s role would be to review radionavigation systems against set criteria, before they could be accepted. A radionavigation system adopted by IMO should be reliable, of low user cost, meet general navigation needs, provide accuracy not less than the standards adopted in 1983, and have 99.9% availability.

The study also recommended that changes to carriage requirements should not be considered until world-wide coverage had been achieved by a radionavigation satellite system.

In 1995, an updated study was adopted as the IMO policy for the recognition and acceptance of suitable radionavigation systems intended for international use in the world-wide radio navigation system (resolution A.815(19)). This study additionally recognized the need for provision of position information to support the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS), by locating vessels in distress. The needs of high speed craft, such as fast ferries, were recognized and the study noted that ships operating at speeds above 30 knots may need more stringent accuracy requirements.

Performance standards for shipborne GPS receiver equipment were also adopted in 1995, and for GLONASS receivers in 1996. GPS became fully operational in 1995 and GLONASS in 1996. Both systems were recognized by IMO as components of the world-wide radionavigation system in 1996.

Meeting Maritime User Needs
IMO Member States acknowledged that there was a need to look ahead, to ensure that any future GNSS would meet maritime user needs. “Maritime Requirements for a Future Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)” were developed and adopted by the IMO Assembly in 1997 (resolution A.860(20)). This emphasized the need for IMO to play a continued role in monitoring the developments and ensuring that any future GNSS meets IMO requirements, including those for navigational accuracy, integrity of the service, availability, reliability and coverage.

In 2000, with both GPS and GLONASS systems now fully functional and providing the required degree of reliability, IMO moved forward with adopting mandatory carriage requirements for GNSS.

A revised SOLAS chapter V (Safety of Navigation), which entered into force in 2002, requires ships to carry a GNSS or terrestrial radionavigation receiver, to establish and update the ship’s position by automatic means, for use at all times throughout the voyage.

IMO also adopted MSC resolutions on updated performance standards for Shipborne Global Positioning System (GPS) Receiver Equipment (MSC.112(73)), for GLONASS Receiver Equipment (MSC.113(73)), for Shipborne DGPS and DGLONASS Maritime Radio Beacon Receiver Equipment (MSC.114(73)) and for shipborne combined GPS/GLONASS receiver equipment (MSC.115(73)).

Reflecting the increased positional accuracy provided by GPS and GLONASS, an updated resolution giving the IMO policy for the recognition and acceptance of suitable radio navigation systems intended for international use was adopted in 2003 by the IMO Assembly (resolution A.953(23)).

This resolution made the accuracy standards required more stringent (revoking those agreed in 1983): in harbour entrances, harbour approaches and coastal waters, positional information error should not be greater than 10 meters with a probability of 95%. In ocean waters, the system should provide positional information with an error not greater than 100 meters with a probability of 95%.

In 2011, IMO further updated the IMO policy for recognizing and accepting suitable radionavigation systems intended for international use (resolution A.1046(27)), inviting Governments to keep IMO informed of the operational development of any suitable radionavigation systems which might be considered for use by ships worldwide.

The resolution also specifically requested the Maritime Safety Committee to recognize systems conforming to IMO requirements. Such recognition would mean IMO recognizes that the system is capable of providing adequate position information within its coverage area and that the carriage of receiving equipment for use with the system satisfies the relevant requirements of the SOLAS Convention.

New GNSS Providers Recognized
The BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS), proposed by the People’s Republic of China, was developed in the 2000s and IMO was requested to develop performance standards for BDS receivers. The performance standards were adopted in 2014 (resolution MSC.379(93)).

BDS was recognized as a component of the world-wide radio navigation system in 2014. Full operational capability for BeiDou is anticipated to be reached by 2020. The IMO recognition (SN.1/Circ.329) notes that the static and dynamic accuracy of the system is 100 meters (95%) and it is therefore not suitable for navigation in harbour entrances and approaches, and other waters in which freedom to maneuver is limited.

The European Galileo Global Navigation Satellite System was developed and presented to IMO as a future component of the GNSS in the early 2000s. Performance standards for Galileo shipborne receivers were adopted by IMO in 2006 (resolution MSC.233(82)). The MSC recognized Galileo in 2016 (SN.1/Circ.334), noting that, in future, the static and dynamic accuracy of the Galileo system is expected to be better than 10 meters with a probability of 95%, with integrity provided by Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) techniques. Once full operational capability is met, it will be suitable for navigation in harbour entrances, harbour approaches and coastal waters. Full operational capability for Galileo is also anticipated to be reached by 2020.

A further system, the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS) — now also known in India as NaVIC (Navigation Indian Constellation) — is now being considered by IMO. Performance standards for IRNSS receiver equipment will be developed by 2019, and its possible recognition as part of the world-wide radio navigation system will be assessed.

Multi-System Shipborne Radio Navigation Receiver Equipment
Meanwhile, in June 2015, the Maritime Safety Committee adopted performance standards for multi-system shipborne radionavigation receiver equipment to ensure that ships are provided with resilient position-fixing equipment suitable for use with available radionavigation systems throughout their voyage (resolution MSC.401(95), updated by MSC.432(98)).

Such equipment can allow the combined use of current and future radionavigation as well as augmentation systems for the provision of position, velocity and time data within the maritime navigation system.

The World-Wide RadioNavigation System for the Future
As technology continues to develop, the world-wide radionavigation system can also be seen in the context of the wider IMO strategy for e-navigation, approved in 2008, which is intended to meet present and future user needs through harmonization of marine navigation systems and supporting shore services.

A key element in the e-navigation strategy relates to position fixing systems, which will need to meet user needs in terms of accuracy, integrity, reliability and system redundancy in accordance with the level of risk and volume of traffic.

A detailed e-navigation Strategy Implementation Plan (SIP), approved in 2014, sets out a framework and a road map of tasks that would need to be implemented or conducted in the future to give effect to five prioritized e-navigation solutions, one of which is the improved reliability, resilience and integrity of bridge equipment and navigation information, and another being the integration and presentation of available information in graphical displays received via communication equipment.

IMO will continue to oversee the world-wide radionavigation system and to have a role in recognizing systems that may be developed in the future. IMO also has a role to ensure the reliability, integrity and resilience of such systems.

The development of satellite-based position systems — GNSS — has enabled a leap forward in the accuracy standards required of such systems and has no doubt contributed to improved safety, efficiency and environmental protection at sea.

This has implications for both carriage requirements for navigational equipment as well as for the human element, in terms of training requirements.

IMO will continue to provide the forum for careful consideration of any requirements, in order to maintain carriage requirements recognizing the significant value and use of GNSS, but also to ensure that alternative systems continue to be mandated, for more resiliency and redundancy.

IMO
The International Maritime Organization – is the United Nations specialized agency with responsibility for the safety and security of shipping and the prevention of marine pollution by ships.

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Airspace is subject to the territorial sovereignty of the respective underlying state, and that state can therefore exercise a level of discretion in prohibiting or conditioning activities in that area which is only limited by international obligations resting upon that state – for instance, following certain international aviation treaties. The only exception here concerns airspaces over international waters, for which the 1944 Chicago Convention provides a general solution regarding the regulation of aviation for safety purposes. In general, as a consequence the use of GNSS and their services in the context of aviation is dealt with by air law, national as well as international, as a body of law principally regulating activities in airspaces, national as well as international.

Outer space, by contrast, is defined as an area not subject as such to any territorial or quasi-territorial sovereignty, a virtual “global commons”, where the freedom of use and exploration is the baseline legal principle and such freedom can only be curtailed, at the international level, by applicable international (space) law. This principle has been codified in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, to which all important spacefaring nations are party. The Outer Space Treaty at the same time provides for a first embryonic set of international obligations resting upon states which limit the baseline freedom of use and exploration, while several other space treaties as well as customary international law and more general treaties which impact outer space and space activities provide for further limitations. This is what is commonly labeled “space law”, a body of (in first instance international) rules addressing such space activities. Only at a secondary level, national law or (in the case of the European Union) EU law plays a role, partly in implementing and applying the international regime in a national respectively EU context.

When analyzing to what extent space law has an impact on GNSS, furthermore, we should realize that GNSS from an overarching legal perspective comprises five main elements: (1) ground stations controlling by way of (2) radio signals (3) the satellites launched into and then operating in outer space, emitting (4) the position, navigation and timing (PNT) signals allowing (5) relevant receivers to calculate positioning and navigation information. 

Elements (1) and (5) are not generally considered to be a subject which space law should regulate, as they fall completely within the sovereign jurisdiction of whatever state the ground stations respectively receivers find itself in. For the sake of simplicity, any receiver infrastructure in outer space is not further discussed in the contribution, whereas any similar receiver infrastructure in airspace is subsumed within the concept of receivers as it is legally subject to the same territorial jurisdiction (as further regulated internationally by air law).

Elements (2) and (4), which at least in part traverse outer space on their way to respectively back from the satellites, are effectively dealt with already by an international body of law dealing with all communications, not with space communications only; hence these will not be dealt with in any detail here.

For completeness’s sake, suffice it here to point to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) which, in a legal sense, operates on the basis of the ITU Constitution, the ITU Convention, and whatever is the most recent version of the Radio Regulations, listed in Additional Resources near the end of this article. Once it had become clear that satellites could be integrated in the international infrastructure for communications in the late 1950s, it was agreed that the ITU presented the obvious forum to address these issues as it had since decades already addressed the issue of potential interference on the international level, by developing and implementing an elaborate system of coordination of frequency use. The ITU’s legal involvement with satellites, including GNSS, remains limited however to such coordination of frequencies and attendant orbits.

That leaves most prominently element (3) to be subject to space law. Following primarily from the aforementioned Outer Space Treaty and two of its successor treaties, the 1972 Liability Convention and the 1975 Registration Convention (See Additional Resources), the following fundamental legal rules and obligations would then arise which are of particular importance for GNSS.

Freedom of Use and Exploration for the Benefit of All Mankind
This principle notably emanates from Articles I and II of the Outer Space Treaty, and would generally include the use of satellites for positioning, timing and navigation purposes. The limits to this freedom under the Outer Space Treaty are fairly limited, and remain essentially confined to an obligation to comply with general international law as applicable (Article III, Outer Space Treaty, which specifically references the UN Charter), to undertake reasonable efforts to avoid harmful interference with other legitimate space activities (Article IX, Outer Space Treaty) and to share any relevant scientific information gathered in the context of operations with the world community (Article XI, Outer Space Treaty).

Conversely, it will be clear that GNSS actually contributes – at least in principle – to the benefits of space activities for all mankind, since it allows many activities on earth or in the airspaces above it to take place safer, quicker and more efficiently. This would apply in particular, of course, to the extent the GNSS signals would be openly and freely available – which currently is the case with GPS and GLONASS Standard Positioning Signals, whereas also BeiDou and Galileo plan to offer such openly and freely accessible signals. The only exceptions would be where GNSS would be used, for instance, for supporting the unlawful use of force, so as to violate Article III of the Outer Space Treaty. This would mainly refer to the use of force other than in the exercise of the right of self-defense (Article 51, UN Charter) or following a mandate of the UN Security Council (Article 42, UN Charter).

Responsibility of States for National Activities in Outer Space
This responsibility also pertains to the operation of GNSS satellites. If such satellites are involved in activities violating the rights of other states (such as referenced above), it will be the state or states as whose “national activities” these operations qualify, which will be held responsible under international law (Article VI, Outer Space Treaty). Such violations would then give rise to a requirement for the violating state(s) to remedy the situation and as appropriate apologize, punish responsible operators and/or provide assurances that such violations will not occur again. This is independent from the occurrence of actual damage, which may in addition give rise to obligations to compensate for such damage, even beyond the particular concept of liability dealt with below. Thus, the United States would be responsible for GPS operations, the Russian Federation for GLONASS operations, and the People’s Republic of China for BeiDou operations.

Since such state responsibility also pertains to satellite operations conducted by private operators, any future private operator of Galileo pursuant to a concession would also give rise to the responsibility of the state(s) as whose “national activities in outer space” such operations would qualify. The idea of having Galileo operated under a concession, as originally intended by the European Commission, turned out to be premature, but it cannot and is not excluded that in the future this may change.

While the EU is in the political and financial lead when it comes to Galileo, and the European Space Agency (ESA) has been the initial developer in a technical and operational sense, pursuant to Articles VI and XIII of the Outer Space Treaty such international responsibility ultimately rests with the member states, or at least with the member states which are involved specifically in the Galileo programs. To what extent the seat of the European GNSS Agency (GSA), the hosting of ground stations for the purpose of Galileo, or relative investments into Galileo might cause for specific responsibility of specific member states is an issue for internal considerations; any third state complaining about any perceived illegality of Galileo operations would in principle have the choice to address any such complaints against any of the EU and ESA member states.

Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty furthermore requires the “appropriate State” to ensure “authorization and continuing supervision” of non-governmental entities. As long as Galileo operations would remain the domain of the GSA, as an agency of the European Commission, Articles VI and XIII would allow the European Union to effectively exercise such control over Galileo operations. As soon as, however, a private concessionaire were to take over as operator, one or the other EU/ESA member state would have to step into the breach to ensure the aforementioned “authorization and continuing supervision”, even if in practice the EU/GSA could still be used as the “tool” to achieve that aim.

Liability of States for Physical Damage Caused by Space Objects
Pursuant to this principle, although following a different scheme of attribution based on fundamental involvement with the launch of the space objects concerned (namely that of the so-called “launching State” of the space object at issue; Article VII, Outer Space Treaty; Articles I, II & III, Liability Convention), states are not only responsible but also liable for physical damage caused by space objects. Such damage would then give rise to an obligation to compensate for the damage, which is fault-based only to the extent that damage is caused to other space objects (Articles II & III, Liability Convention) and is in principle without limit (Article XII).

In other words, if a GPS satellite would crash into another space object, the United States would be held liable for the damage caused thereby to the extent the crash would be considered its fault; if the damage by contrast would take place on earth or to aircraft in flight, the United States would be held liable without further ado. The same obviously would apply for the Russian Federation with respect to GLONASS and the People’s Republic of China with respect to BeiDou. 

It is important to note here, that damage is defined, following the general interpretation of the Liability Convention, as direct damage caused by physical impact, meaning that non-physical damage such as radio interference or indirect damage – an aircraft crashing as a consequence of erroneous GNSS information; loss of revenues due to interference – are not compensable. In the context of discussions within the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), for instance, the United States has consistently denied any liability for damage which users of GPS signals or services could suffer due to their trust in those signals or services being unwarranted. Only exceptionally it has been claimed by authors that liability for signals and services emanating from GNSS satellites could be equated to “damage caused by the satellites”, and hence be subject to liability claims pursuant to the Liability Convention. In the US case, it has only been admitted that under particular circumstances liability claims against the US government could be entertained in US courts, to the extent that the Federal Tort Claims Act or Suits in Admiralty Acts might be invoked.

Victims of such types of damages should therefore seek compensation either under the heading of state responsibility as addressed above or in a private capacity in a relevant national court.

Again, international liability also applies for privately-owned and/or -operated GNSS systems; a possible future private concessionaire operating Galileo would thus only be held liable to the extent the states themselves liable would derogate such liability under the concession. While the Liability Convention in this respect offers intergovernmental organizations the opportunity to qualify as a state party to the Convention for practical purposes (Article XXII, Liability Convention), ESA has so far complied with the relevant conditions but not the EU. Even to the extent ESA would be held liable for damage caused by Galileo (due to its initial involvement in system launch and deployment), ultimately the burden of compensation would come to rest upon the ESA member states.

As for the EU, due to absence of its qualification pursuant to Article XXII of the Liability Convention as a de facto party to its regime, legally speaking it is an “invisible” entity. Asserting a claim for damage caused by Galileo and otherwise falling within the scope of the Liability Convention against the EU or the EC consequently would not be legally possible – instead, if the victim state(s) would not favor addressing ESA as per the aforementioned option, the only option left would be to address individual EU member states who could all, legally-technically speaking, be argued to be procuring states (Article I(c)(i), Liability Convention) of the Galileo satellite in question and hence liable.

At the same time, it should be noted that in the Galileo context a substantial element of the proposed package of paid services (as opposed to the open GPS services for which no liability could unequivocally be claimed) would be the inclusion of liability acceptance on the part of the operator. To the extent this approach were to become accepted, users who would rely on Galileo services which would then turn out to be erroneous (hence such reliance would in hindsight be unjustified) and as a consequence cause damage to third parties, would be able to derogate the relevant third-party claims to the Galileo operator. An example on point would be an aircraft crashing as a consequence of malfunctioning of a Galileo service: the derogation of liability would allow the airline to shift the burden of any third-party liability claim under applicable air law treaties ultimately to the Galileo operator.

Registration of Space Objects by States Involved in their Launching
Closely related to the international regime on liability summarized above, states are also required to register – at least in principle – the space objects for which they qualified as “launching State(s)”. This registration obligation is actually twofold. On the one hand, states need to register such space objects in a national register, the details of which are further left to the state of registry (Article II(1), Registration Convention). On the other hand, they are required to provide the United Nations with a specific set of data for the purpose of inclusion in the international register (Articles III, IV, Registration Convention).

Unfortunately, the latter obligation is qualified as “as soon as practicable” (Article IV(1), Registration Convention); coupled with the principled absence of an international monitoring organization, effectively this means that many satellites do not get registered at all (in particular if military in nature).

A further problem concerns the impossibility – at least formally, as per the Registration Convention, to “unregister” or “deregister” satellites. The assumption had simply been that satellites, once launched, would be owned and operated by their principal owner until their end-of-life, so the possibility of change of ownership in-orbit was never seriously contemplated.

Since the possibility of more than one state qualifying as a launching state is real, in view of the four alternative criteria for that, in relevant cases those states should determine which one of them is to fulfill the functions pursuant to the Registration Convention – double registration is legally speaking not possible (Article II(2), Registration Convention).

Clearly, following the above, the United States, the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China are required to register the satellites composing their respective GNSS. A final point of note concerns the fact that, while GPS, GLONASS and BeiDou are obviously multi-satellite systems, pursuant to the Registration Convention each individual launch carrying one or more satellites is registered individually – the main concern driving the registration regime was the launch phase as deemed the by far most risky and accident-prone. 

As for Europe, though similarly to the Liability Convention under the Registration Convention the possibility is open for an intergovernmental organization to become a “party” to the Convention for all practical purposes exists (Article VII, Registration Convention), again only ESA, not the EU has qualified as such. Any EU “register” of Galileo satellites, if ever contemplated, would not have any legal meaning pursuant to the Registration Convention; (Note that in an effort to provide as much relevant identification-related information to the general public, the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs will include any such information provided by the European Union in the international register between brackets, to distinguish it from information provided formally in accordance with the Registration Convention.) The absence moreover of a possibility to register such satellites in two or more states at the same time (Article II(2), registration Convention) also principally excludes such a register under the Convention. Galileo satellites, consequently, could be registered either by ESA or by any EU member state qualifying as the launching State. 

At least to the extent Galileo satellites are launched from Kourou on Ariane launchers, France would be the logical launching state, as the use of its territory and launch facilities for the launch would most unequivocally qualify it as a launching state – much more so than, for instance, Germany or Italy where the main control centers are hosted. In practice, as it turns out, ESA registered the GIOVE satellites in 2005 and 2008; the Galileo IOV and Galileo satellites launched from 2011 onwards, however, were not officially registered with the United Nations, also raising legal questions regarding jurisdiction and control at least under international law (Article VIII, Outer Space Treaty). For more details on this, see Additional Resources.

Mitigation of Space Debris
The issue of space debris is not yet formally dealt with by the space treaties in any relevant detail: the provision coming closest to addressing the issue concerns that which requires a state which “has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space (…) would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies” to “undertake appropriate international consultations before proceeding with any such activity or experiment” (Article IX, Outer Space Treaty). Vice versa as per the same Article, a state potentially victimized by such harmful interference may require consultations – yet there is not obligation not to create any space debris, let alone to clean up one’s own or indeed any space debris already out there. 

In that sense, the only remaining support coming directly from the space treaties of relevance here would be the inclusion of space debris in the concept of “space object”, which means that damage caused by space debris under the Liability Convention would give rise to compensation – on the assumption, of course, that the launching state of that space debris could (still) be identified.

Only recently legal developments have started to address the problem of space debris more profoundly. Partly in further elaboration of the aforementioned Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, the major space agencies gathered together in the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) in 2002 drafted a first set of (legally non-binding) Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, which has been further buttressed by a relevant set of UNCOPUS guidelines in 2010. Those guidelines may well develop into customary international law over the coming years, in particular as increasingly individual states licensing private operators include compliance with the guidelines in the conditions for being granted a license to undertake space activities in the first place – which is certainly binding upon those licensees. Of the countries concerned with GNSS, at least for the United States and the member states of ESA (which is a prominent member of the IADC) this holds true, which means such principles will also be applied at least to GPS- and Galileo-related launches.

In Conclusion
While it is clear that GNSS constitutes one of the most beneficial space operations and space-based applications, the legal regime pursuant to international space law remains fairly general and limited in its specific guidance of such operations and activities. Partly that is due to a general lack of political awareness of the relevance of compliance with such issues as registration and space debris, which would hopefully change as more and more terrestrial users become dependent upon satellite navigation services. Partly it is due to the remaining crucial impact of national sovereignty in this particular field of international law; the absence of sovereign control by other states than the GNSS operator states over the applications on their territory or within their airspace and the potential consequences in terms of liability understandably causes a considerable amount of hesitation in allowing to reap the full potential benefits of GNSS.

In Europe, with respect to Galileo, the legal situation is even more wanting. While ESA is able to register satellites and has actually done so with the first few launched, the leading position that the EU has increasingly taken in this respect has not yet translated into properly addressing such issues – neither have, probably as a consequence of the Union’s lead role, individual EU/ESA member states such as France, Germany or Italy. Thus, even at the level of the fairly succinct body of international space law, much still needs to be done to arrive at a proper legal framework properly implemented.

Additional Resources 
[1] Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter), San Francisco, done 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945; USTS 993; 24 UST 2225; 59 Stat. 1031; 145 UKTS 805; UKTS 1946 No. 67; Cmd. 6666 & 6711; CTS 1945 No. 7; ATS 1945 No. 1.
[2] Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU Constitution), Geneva, done 22 December 1992, entered into force 1 July 1994; 1825 UNTS 1; UKTS 1996 No. 24; Cm. 2539; ATS 1994 No. 28; Final Acts of the Additional Plenipotentiary Conference, Geneva, 1992 (1993), at 1.
[3] Convention of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU Convention), Geneva, done 22 December 1992, entered into force 1 July 1994; 1825 UNTS 1; UKTS 1996 No. 24; Cm. 2539; ATS 1994 No. 28; Final Acts of the Additional Plenipotentiary Conference, Geneva, 1992 (1993), at 71.
[4] Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Liability Convention), London/Moscow/Washington, done 29 March 1972, entered into force 1 September 1972; 961 UNTS 187; TIAS 7762; 24 UST 2389; UKTS 1974 No. 16; Cmnd. 5068; ATS 1975 No. 5; 10 ILM 965 (1971).
[5] Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (Registration Convention), New York, done 14 January 1975, entered into force 15 September 1976; 1023 UNTS 15; TIAS 8480; 28 UST 695; UKTS 1978 No. 70; Cmnd. 6256; ATS 1986 No. 5; 14 ILM 43 (1975).
[6] Radio Regulations Articles, Edition of 2016 (Radio Regulations).
[7] Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty), London/Moscow/Washington, done 27 January 1967, entered into force 10 October 1967; 610 UNTS 205; TIAS 6347; 18 UST 2410; UKTS 1968 No. 10; Cmnd. 3198; ATS 1967 No. 24; 6 ILM 386 (1967).
[8] United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs; see here; search “Galileo”.

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Precise timing is essential for the functioning of any global navigation satellite system (GNSS). GNSS themselves are part of national critical infrastructures in key sectors of the economy such as electricity distribution, telecommunications, and all modes of transport, which require accurate and reliable time to operate effectively. In all of these sectors, the time information required can be obtained from GNSS signals, underpinned by the international infrastructure for time and frequency metrology. In this article, we will describe this global metrology system for timekeeping, explain how it underpins the time information provided by GNSS, and introduce the important concept of traceability in measurement.

According to the U.S. Government’s official GPS website: “In addition to longitude, latitude, and altitude, the Global Positioning System (GPS) provides a critical fourth dimension – time. Each GPS satellite contains multiple atomic clocks that contribute very precise time data to the GPS signals. GPS receivers decode these signals, effectively synchronizing each receiver to the atomic clocks. This enables users to determine the time to within 100 billionths of a second (100 nanoseconds), without the cost of owning and operating atomic clocks.” The term “time” is used with at least two connotations: time interval and time of day. In many countries, laws or decrees prescribe the use of certain units such as the second of the International System of units (or SI) for time interval and its inverse, the hertz, for frequency.

In official use, a link to the national time standards maintained in National Metrology Institutes (NMIs) – such as the National Physical Laboratory (NPL) in the United Kingdom and Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB) in Germany – is essential if measurements are being made with any claim to accuracy. Many countries have a “time law” that prescribes adherence to a certain time scale as the legal time, and often the NMI, or sometimes another institute, is entrusted explicitly with its dissemination. In practice, the common global time scale, Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), provides the underlying reference in all countries, with the appropriate time zone and summer time offsets applied.

From a purely technical point of view, GNSS signals are capable of providing the required time information. All GNSS system time scales are based on the international reference time scale, Coordinated Universal Time (UTC). There are two types of offsets between these system time scales and UTC. Integer second offsets exist because leap seconds have been introduced in UTC, but not in GPS time, Galileo System Time (GST), or BeiDou time. In addition, at the nanosecond level, “small” offsets exist. But when it comes to court, questions may be asked such as “Who told the satellite clock what time-of-day it is?” Or “Are the time-of-day and the time unit provided by GNSS traceable to UTC?” Traceability is a key concept in metrology, and requires an unbroken chain of comparisons or calibrations between a measurement result and a reference standard, with measurement uncertainty assigned to each step. The words in italics are close to the definition of the term in the International Vocabulary of Metrology (known by its French abbreviation, VIM), and apply just as much to a measurement of time based on received GNSS satellite signals as to any other measurement procedure.

In the next section, we will explain in brief the operation of the international metrology system and the realization of UTC to which the national realizations and thus legal times adhere. A section on dissemination of GNSS times follows, including some detail about the “time”-related quantities included. Finally, we discuss options for the validation of GNSS time signals so that their use can be compliant with legal prescriptions and briefly touch upon the issue of liability.

The BIPM and Time Scales
The International Bureau of Weights and Measures (BIPM) is the intergovernmental organization which organizes and supports the joint work of Member State signatories of the Metre Convention on matters related to metrology and measurement standards. The BIPM, which is located in Paris, France, is overseen by the International Committee for Weights and Measures (CIPM), made up of 18 elected representatives from the NMIs. The CIPM also has a number of Consultative Committees that provide more detailed guidance and coordination of specific areas of metrology, including the Consultative Committee for Time and Frequency (CCTF). Overall supervision and strategy formulation is provided by the General Conference on Weights and Measures (CGPM), formed by delegates from the 58 Member States who meet every four years.

The BIPM has the particular task to generate and disseminate the international reference time scale UTC, which is carried out by its Time Department. UTC is a post-processed time scale; it is the result of worldwide cooperation of 78 institutes (as of March 2017), mainly NMIs, but also including some astronomical observatories and research centers that operate high-quality atomic clocks and time transfer equipment, which we will collectively refer to as timing centers. Clock and time transfer data are regularly reported to the BIPM, which calculates UTC early in each calendar month from data covering the previous month. The results of the processing are published in the BIPM Circular T. UTC is thus a “paper” time scale and is physically represented (only) by the realizations of UTC, known as UTC(k) time scales, maintained by the 78 timing centers. UTC provides the reference for all precise time and frequency measurements and transmissions worldwide, including the GNSS system time scales, as will be explained below.

Each monthly Circular T reports the time differences UTC – UTC(k) at 5-day intervals, with specified uncertainties. As an example, illustrating the accuracy achieved today and the significance for GNSS, the differences from UTC over one year of three time scales that serve as references for GNSS system times are depicted in Figure 1 (see the top of this article for all figures). UTC(USNO) is realized at the United States Naval Observatory, Washington D.C., and serves as the time reference for GPS. UTC(SU) is realized at the Russian Institute VNIIFTRI, Mendeleevo, Moscow Region, and serves as the time reference for GLONASS. UTCE is the average of five UTC(k) time scales realized at European timing institutes, and serves as the time reference for Galileo.

It is important to note that many, though not all, of the institutes maintaining UTC(k) time scales are NMIs that are signatories of the Mutual Recognition Arrangement (MRA) established by the CIPM. The MRA provides a framework for NMIs to demonstrate the equivalence of their measurement standards and services. Thus, traceability to UTC can in theory be obtained equivalently from any of the NMIs that are signatories of the CIPM MRA. However, there is a stumbling block: USNO is not an NMI and thus did not sign the MRA, so it is not able to demonstrate formal traceability to UTC through its UTC(USNO) time scale based on its internal measurement capabilities. The other institutes involved are NMIs and are covered by the MRA. Further measures are therefore needed to obtain traceability to UTC in the strict sense by receiving GPS signals.

Metrology worldwide is coordinated through the regional metrology organizations (RMOs), with memberships based on the NMIs of the countries represented. There are currently six RMOs, as shown in Figure 2. The European Association of National Metrology Institutes, known as EURAMET, is the RMO that covers Europe. It coordinates the cooperative activities of NMIs in Europe in fields such as metrology research, traceability of measurements to the SI units, international recognition of national measurement standards, and certification of the Calibration and Measurement Capabilities (CMCs) of its members. The work of EURAMET is organized in 12 Technical Committees (TC), of which one deals with Time and Frequency (TC-TF). The EURAMET website lists the institutes participating in TC-TF, which are the institutes responsible for time and frequency in each country, and the current contact persons.

A study of the legal time regulations and practices across Europe was published by the EURAMET TC-TF in 2011, and is available for download from the EURAMET website. It revealed wide variations in the procedures adopted by different countries. For example, just over half of the 34 countries participating in the survey have their legal time defined in legislation, but in varying levels of detail. In 11 of those countries the NMI is responsible for realizing legal time, but dissemination of legal time is an NMI responsibility in 20 countries. In all countries, however, UTC is in practice the underlying reference time scale, with the appropriate time zone and daylight saving time offsets applied.

GNSS Time Scales and How they are Disseminated
The primary purpose of any GNSS is to serve as a positioning and navigation system. But each system relies on accurate timing, and pseudorange measurements made by a receiver are combined with the data reported in the GNSS navigation message to provide among other parameters, time to users that require it. Details of signal properties and the on-board configurations of the satellites in the existing GNSS are well documented and explained further in textbooks on GNSS, including in the handbook published by the International Telecommunication Union (2010) listed in Additional Resources near the end of this article. The navigation messages include the almanac, orbit parameters, and parameters that relate the individual satellite clock time to the underlying GNSS system time. Details of the data format are given in the sidebar “Tabulating Time-Related Data from Galileo and GPS Navigation Messages.” As explained in the context of Figure 1, the system times are steered towards realizations of UTC, except for the integer second offsets that result from different choices of origin and system time scales (other than that of GLONASS) not applying leap second adjustments.

Using GNSS Signals as a Source of UTC
Two distinct types of GNSS timing receiver have been developed. The more sophisticated “scientific” receivers, sometimes called time transfer receivers, determine the pseudorange of each satellite in view with respect to signals from a local reference clock connected to the receiver, and use the information contained in the navigation message to provide output data in the form of local reference clock minus GNSS time. Recommendations on a common data file format and a standard formula and parameters for data evaluation were developed jointly by the BIPM and the CCTF. For wider use, in particular for positioning and navigation, the “Receiver Independent Exchange” format, RINEX, was developed as part of the work of the International GNSS Service (IGS).

For this article, the more relevant receivers are those designed to discipline the frequency of their inbuilt quartz oscillator (or rubidium atomic frequency standard) to GNSS time and to deliver standard frequency (typically 10 megahertz) and a one-pulse-per-second (1 PPS) output signals representing the GNSS time. A GPS-only device like this is often called a GPS-disciplined oscillator (GPSDO), and is widely used in calibration laboratories, industry, and wherever accurate frequency is required. Another class of instruments outputs the time-of-day information, converted from the navigation message, either in a clock display, in standard electrical time codes such as IRIG, or by acting as a Network Time Protocol (NTP) server for time dissemination in networks. We will consider the use of these devices in the next section.

The EURAMET TC-TF has prepared a technical guide for calibration laboratories that use GPSDOs as their source of frequency or time traceability to UTC, which was published in 2016, and is available for download (see Additional Resources). The guide discusses in detail the requirements that a calibration laboratory should meet in order to claim formal traceability to UTC when using a GPSDO. The considerable variations in regulations across Europe created some complications, but there was agreement on a range of core requirements. In particular, calibration of the GPSDO is recommended if low uncertainties are claimed (better than 1 microsecond for time, or 1 part in 10¹¹ for frequency), and a method is needed to verify correct operation when the GPSDO is in use, for example by monitoring its internal control parameters or by comparing it with a second, independent, standard.

Validation of GNSS-Based Timing
Figure 4 sketches the steps from GNSS signal generation in the GNSS Ground Segment (GS), through the Space Segment (SS), to the user application. Inside the perimeter of GNSS operations, there are certainly numerous cross-checks to verify the properties of the GNSS system time and the parameters of the navigation message. Each of the GNSS operators has established a public web portal with information about anomalies, signal outages etc. In the case of Galileo, the European GNSS Service Centre provides “Notice Advisories to Galileo Users” (NAGUs). But these do not represent a satellite-by-satellite publicly available verification of signal content, or a means to establish traceability of measurements based on GNSS signals to national or international standards.

The situation at the boundary line between the space and user segments (SS-US in Figure 4) has become a hot topic: how to protect against spoofing, and how to verify or authenticate the signals arriving at the receiver? The subject was recently treated in depth in Inside GNSS in an article by Gianluca Caparra et alia (2016).

In some GNSS markets, including civil aviation and the maritime sector, certification has become common practice or even mandatory. The certification covers the receiver performance, assuming well-defined properties of the received signal at the SS-US border (such as carrier-to-noise density ratio, level of multipath, and interfering signals in neighboring frequency bands). This topic was addressed in Inside GNSS in an article by Jules McNeff (2012). One kind of certification employs a certified signal simulator as a source of signals to be fed directly to the receiver. This, of course, covers only part of the problem. A full certification test would have to take into account the antenna, including its environmental conditions and the antenna cable.

In the timing community, such formal procedures are rare. The 78 laboratories worldwide operate around 200 GNSS timing receivers from at least five different, commercially independent manufacturers. There is therefore some variety of both hardware (front-end, signal processing etc.) and the proprietary software to provide data outputs, enabling confidence in their performance to be built up through cross-comparisons. This network of receivers can be considered as a verification mechanism for the timing properties of GNSS signals. The GNSS monitoring bulletins published free of charge by several NMIs, including NPL and PTB, provide a readily available means of confirming that the broadcast GNSS timing signals were correct. The bulletins support the demonstration of traceability between measurements made using the space signals, for example when using a GPSDO, and the UTC(k) time scale of the issuing NMI.

To be more specific, we can consider the situation in PTB. Up to eight GNSS receivers from four different manufacturers have been operated during recent years, and their observations are compared daily. Standard daily observation files in the formats described in the paper by Pascale Defraigne and Gérard Petit, (2015) and listed in Additional Resources, and – as far as possible — in RINEX format are publicly available for the previous day at <ftp://ftp.ptb.de/pub/time/GNSS/> in various folders. These files provide a direct reference to UTC(PTB) for the experienced user. For the public, a weekly Time Service Bulletin (TSB) is published at ftp://ftp.ptb.de/pub/time/bulletin/. Users in Germany who seek to obtain traceability to German legal time from GNSS signals are advised to take note of the contents of the TSB, or are guided to perform data analysis by following standard procedures to obtain evidence of the performance of their local equipment. Near-real-time services that also verify the full data content of the navigation message (see again the sidebar at the end of this article) are not yet available, but such services are possible to set up using the real-time services provided by the IGS.

Dissemination of GNSS Time Across Networks
Time distribution in Local Area Networks using the Network Time Protocol (NTP) or the Precision Time Protocol (PTP) has become well established, and a wide variety of equipment is on the market to serve the needs. For security reasons, the servers used are often not connected to the internet. Instead of obtaining time via NTP from public servers, the time-of-day information included in the GNSS SIS is translated into the NTP or PTP messages. The line labelled REC-APPL in Figure 4 indicates that the transmission of time information from a receiver into an application is another process whose correctness needs to be assessed carefully to verify traceability. One option, implemented in some equipment, is to cross-check the time-of-day information from the GNSS signals against the time signals received through a second reference, which would typically be a dedicated standard frequency and time broadcast service, such as DCF77 in Germany and MSF in the U.K.

Within Europe, new regulations drafted by the financial services regulator, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), specify that beginning January 3, 2018, all automated trades are timestamped to UTC with an uncertainty no greater than 100 microseconds. After consultation, ESMA has concluded that GPS and other GNSS services can be used as the time source provided that measures are put in place to demonstrate traceability and that the receiver is working correctly. Exchanges and trading venues must therefore modify or upgrade their timing infrastructure to provide evidence of UTC traceability at all times when trading is taking place, even if they are already distributing time through their networks from a GNSS source.

With such regulations in place in finance, and similar timing requirements appearing in other areas such as smart-grids and the efficient use of renewable energy, the question of the liability of GNSS operators in the event of users incurring significant costs as a result of errors in the signals received at the SS-US interface (see Figure 3) has become quite topical. Although we are not qualified to answer legal questions, our understanding is that the so-called Interface Control Documents (ICDs), cited in the sidebar at the end of this article for the cases of GPS and Galileo, are the primary references in any controversy. If the signals generated in the Space Segment comply with the specifications in the ICDs, the operator of the GNSS has done its job well.

Many readers will remember the “GPS Ground System Anomaly” reported by the U.S. Air Force on Jan 27, 2016. In its official press release it stated: “On 26 January at 12:49 a.m. MST, the 2nd Space Operations Squadron at the 50th Space Wing, Schriever Air Force Base, Colo., verified users were experiencing GPS timing issues. Further investigation revealed an issue in the Global Positioning System ground software which only affected the time on legacy L-band signals. This change occurred when the oldest vehicle, SVN 23, was removed from the constellation. While the core navigation systems were working normally, the coordinated universal time timing signal was off by 13 microseconds which exceeded the design specifications.” The publicly available information, derived from the detailed analysis of the event provided from the proceedings of ION GNSS+ 2016 and listed in Additional Resources, indicates that the parameters A0 and WN_OT (see Table 3) were transmitted incorrectly by an increasing number of satellites for several hours. However, the ICD states that such data should be regarded as invalid if WN_OT is so different from the current epoch (here more than two years).

If any user application was affected by this anomaly – it affected only timing users, not positioning services – the software routines evaluating the SIS messages were not sufficiently following the underlying ICD. It therefore appears unlikely that the GNSS operator could be held liable for any losses incurred in this or similar cases, although it will not be possible to make any definitive statements until a claim has been tested in a court of law.

A Look Ahead at Liability
To conclude this section, we try to analyze the aspect of liability from our (non-expert) point of view. Should a future event cause real loss or damage to users of GNSS time applications, the legal treatment of claims would be faced with enormous complexities. While the stakeholders involved would likely undertake all necessary investigations for identifying the root cause of the event, affected users would also have to provide proof of underlying fault. As users will lack the necessary insights into the complex chain underlying GNSS time applications, provision of such proof may be very difficult. The detailed legal background was reported in an earlier contribution in this “GNSS & the Law” column (see Additional Resources). According to this analysis, no contractual liability could be evoked if the root cause lies in the performance of one of the GNSS systems. Non-contractual liability is limited due to the doctrine of sovereign immunity and applicable national laws on state liability. Both the U.S. and Russian governments traditionally deny any legal responsibility for the performance of GPS or GLONASS system and signal performance, and China also has not made any commitments in this respect.

Regarding Galileo, the European Union (EU) as the owner of the system and the European GNSS Agency (GSA) as the user services provider, theoretically bear non-contractual liability under Article 340 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). However, compensation is to be made “in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States”, which leaves a significant level of uncertainty. Furthermore, the European Commission has recently published so-called Service Definition Documents for the Open Service and Search and Rescue initial services. Both documents contain terms and conditions for the use of these services, including a rather far-reaching disclaimer of liability. The EU and the other entities involved do not offer any warranty regarding service availability, continuity, accuracy, integrity, reliability and fitness for purpose. They shall not be held liable for any damages resulting from the use of the service, other than in accordance with Article 340 TFEU. Even for Galileo, affected users will be faced with significant legal and factual barriers to receiving compensation.

On the international level, there are no specific legal instruments governing liability for GNSS signals and services.

For more than 15 years, the matter has been discussed within the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT). However, all these efforts have not resulted in any common position or the development of any proposal for a legal instrument. Overall, users will therefore have enormous difficulties in receiving compensation for their loss or damage arising from malfunctioning of GNSS time services.

Conclusion
Precise time is crucial to a great variety of economic activities around the world. Communication systems, electric power grids, and financial networks all rely on accurate and reliable timing for synchronization and operational efficiency. The free availability of GPS time has enabled cost savings for companies that depend on precise time and has led to significant advances in capability.

Companies worldwide use GPS to time-stamp business transactions, providing a consistent and accurate way to maintain records and ensure their traceability. Major financial institutions use GPS to obtain precise time for setting the internal clocks used to timestamp financial transactions. Large and small businesses are turning to automated systems that can track, update, and manage multiple transactions made by a global network of customers, and these require the accurate timing information available through GPS and from other GNSS in the near future.

We have shown in this article how the time obtained from GNSS satellite signals is related to the international time scale, UTC, and explained how GNSS receivers can be used, with some care to ensure that they are operating correctly, as reliable and traceable sources of time.

SIDEBAR: Tabulating Time-Related Data from Galileo and GPS Navigation Messages

Here, we describe the time-related data from the navigation messages of Galileo and GPS, which are almost identical in format and content.

Space Clock Offset from System Time
The correction between the individual space vehicle clock and GNSS system time at a given time is calculated from the transmitted parameters, here shown for Galileo in Table 1 (see inset, above right, for all tables) (European GNSS [Galileo] Open Service Signal In Space Interface Control Document, OD SIS ICD, European Union (2010), listed in Additional Resources [IB1]). The corresponding definition for GPS is given in §20.3.3.3.1.8 and the associated Table 20-1 in Global Positioning Systems Directorate Systems Engineering & Integration, Interface Specification IS-GPS-200H, listed in Additional Resources [IB2].

Week Numbering and Time of Week
GPS week number zero (0) started at midnight UTC(USNO) Jan. 5, 1980 /morning of Jan. 6, 1980, according to 6.2.4 adapted from specifications described in [IB2]. The Galileo week zero corresponds to GPS week 1024, which after week roll-over was reported as week zero. The GST start epoch was 00:00 UTC Sunday, Aug. 22, 1999. At that epoch, GST was ahead of UTC by 13 seconds. As 12 bits are reserved for the week number, roll over occurs only after about 78 years. Table 2 lists the parameters, as reported in Table 63 of [IB1].

Offset Between System Time and UTC
Both GPS and Galileo provide parameters to estimate time in UTC from the system time for a given epoch. The parameters comprise the integer seconds offset due to the leap seconds in UTC, and offset and rate coefficients for the accurate prediction of the difference (at ns-level). They are listed in Table 3, based on §20.3.3.5.2.4 of [IB2] and Table 69 of [IB1]. As previously stated, offset from UTC means from UTC(USNO) in the case of GPS and from a prediction of UTC, based on UTCE, in the case of Galileo. We can see from Figure 1 that – at least for the period covered – the differences are marginal, but not zero and not identical. Tables 2 and 3 represent the means of accurately determining “time-of-day” in UTC via GNSS signals.

Offset Between System Times
In support of interoperability, GPS and Galileo report the predicted time offset between the two system times, termed GGTO, in the navigation message. This is covered by §5.1.8 of [IB1] and §30.3.3.8 in [IB2], respectively. In the sign convention of [IB2] the quantity GGTO is equal to Galileo System Time (GST) minus GPS time. GNSS receivers that generate data files according to the Receiver Independent Exchange Format RINEX version 3.01 and higher report these quantities. As an example, see the header of a navigation file (Figure 3 in the main text) retrieved from a GNSS timing receiver, operated at PTB. The file was generated on day 310 of year 2016, day 6 of GPS week 1921 (WN), which starts with second 518400 (TOW). Quantities of interest here are shown in the red lines. GPGA represents GGTO as just defined, although the wording on the sign can be a bit ambiguous.

Additional Resources
[1] Baumann, I., “Liability for GNSS Signals and Services”, Inside GNSS, Vol. 10, No. 6, Nov./Dec. 2015, pp. 38-45, 2015.
[2] Caparra, G., and C. Wullems, S. Ceccato, S. Sturaro, N. Laurenti, O. Pozzobon, R.T. Ioannides, and M. Crisci, “Design Drivers and New Trends for Navigation Message Authentication Schemes for GNSS Systems”, Inside GNSS, Volume Sept./Oct. 2016, pp. 64 – 73, 2016.
[3] Defraigne, P. and G. Petit, “CGGTTS-Version 2E: an extended standard for GNSS Time Transfer,” Metrologia, Volume 52, G1, 2015.
[4] Dow, J. M., and R.M. Neilan, and G. Gendt, “The International GPS Service: celebrating the 10th anniversary and looking to the next decade,” Adv. Space Res. 36 (2005) 320.
[5] EURAMET TC-TF, “Guidelines on the Use of GPS Disciplined Oscillators for Frequency or Time Traceability, Technical Guide No. 3, Version 1.0 (2016),” free download here.
[6] European GNSS (Galileo) Open Service Signal In Space Interface Control Document, OD SIS ICD, Issue 1, February 2010, European Union 2010; Listed as [IB1] in the main text.
[7] Global Positioning Systems Directorate Systems Engineering & Integration, Interface Specification IS-GPS-200H, 24. Sept. 2013; Listed as [IB2] in the main text.
[8] Guinot, B. and E.F. Arias, “Atomic time-keeping from 1955 to the present”, Metrologia, Volume 42, pp. 20-30, 2005.
[9] Gurtner, W., and Estey, L., “RINEX The Receiver Independent Exchange Format Version 3.01,” Werner Gurtner, Astronomical Institute University of Bern, and Lou Estey, UNAVCO Boulder, Co., 22 June 2009.
[10] ITU Study Group 7, “ITU Handbook: Satellite Time and Frequency Transfer and Dissemination, International Telecommunication Union,” Geneva, 2010.
[11] Joint Committee for Guides in Metrology, “International vocabulary of metrology — Basic and general concepts and associated terms (VIM)”, Working Group 2 of the Joint Committee for Guides in Metrology (JCGM/WG 2) (2008).
[12] Kovach, K., and P.J. Mendicki, E.D. Powers, and B. Renfro, “GPS Receiver Impact from the UTC Offset (UTCO) Anomaly of 25-26 January 2016”, Proceedings of the 29th International Technical Meeting of the ION Satellite Division, ION GNSS+ 2016, Portland, Oregon, September 12-16, 2016
[13] Lapuh, R., “EURAMET Countries’ Legal Time Regulations and Practices,” EURAMET e.V., 2011, for download here.
[14] McNeff, J., “GPS Receiver Specifications – Compliance and Certification”, Inside GNSS, Vol. 7, No. 3, May/June 2012, pp. 50-56, 2012.
[15] Piriz, R., et alia, “The Time Validation Facility (TVF): An All-New Key Element of the Galileo Operational Phase”, in Proc. IFCS2015_paper_5130, 2015.

The post Traceable Time from GNSS Signals appeared first on Inside GNSS - Global Navigation Satellite Systems Engineering, Policy, and Design.

The BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS) is China’s contribution to the world in the domain of Global Satellite Navigation System (GNSS). The BDS is being developed by the Chinese government, mainly through military departments, with key considerations for China’s national security, economic interests and social progress.

The BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS) is China’s contribution to the world in the domain of Global Satellite Navigation System (GNSS). The BDS is being developed by the Chinese government, mainly through military departments, with key considerations for China’s national security, economic interests and social progress.

After decades of development, the BDS has been recognized as one of the four big players in the field of GNSS. China has also started the development of a comprehensive positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) system with enough capabilities for air, sea, land, underground and underwater terminals, and the BDS is designed as the most important component.

From a structural point of view, the BDS is similar to the other GNSSs and composed of the satellite constellation, distributed ground facilities — including master control stations, uplink stations, and monitoring stations — and user receivers. One special feature is the inclusion of 5 geostationary satellites, raising the number of satellites in the constellation to 35. Another differentiator from the U.S. GPS, Russian GLONASS, and European Galileo system is its unique function of short message communications and position reporting capability, benefiting from the Chinese government’s strong support on both technical and financial aspects.

The BDS is designed and developed as a space infrastructure of national significance to offer two basic services: an open service free of charge and an authorized service with higher quality and integrity. At the current stage, applications based on the BDS are gradually penetrating to every corner of people’s lives and economic activities in the Asia-Pacific Region, particularly for meteorological observation, transport management and search & rescue.

Strategy of the BDS Development
Bearing in mind the mature technology and the policy of free access to open signals provided by GPS, many questions arose about why China should make substantive efforts to develop its own GNSS. However, in addition to the economic benefits created by the navigation industry, developing a domestically controlled GNSS was considered as a national security advantage.

Back in 1996 when the third Taiwan Strait Crisis started, two Chinese missiles failed to reach their targets during an exercise. Chinese military authorities believed that the event occurred due to the U.S. denial of GPS signals. Since then, China decided to develop a satellite navigation system under its own control and to complete the construction of the first generation of the BDS (BDS-1) at the beginning of 21st century.

However, as the BDS-1 was just a regional system with little commercial value, the Chinese government accepted the invitation from the European Union (EU) to join the Galileo program, with the ultimate goal of challenging the monopoly of the U.S. GPS. However, due to certain disagreements with the European Union, including China’s claim of being excluded from the key decision-making process and technical cooperation in the Galileo program, China decided to re-focus its attention on constructing its own GNSS.

Currently, China ranks the BDS as one of the key national technical projects, supported by specific funding; the BDS program is organized pursuant to a three-step strategy: (1) the construction of BDS-1, which was finished in 2000, with the goal of providing services over all of Chinese territory; (2) the construction of the BDS-2, which has been in operation since 2012 with the purpose of covering the Asia-Pacific region; (3) the deployment of the full constellation of BDS satellites, scheduled for completion by around 2020 and intended to offer global services.

Governance Structure of the BDS
Similar to GPS and GLONASS, the BDS is a dual system used for both military and civilian purposes. However, no official source has yet affirmed that the BDS is developed and exclusively controlled by Chinese military departments, despite a widespread belief that many ties exist between the BDS and Chinese People’s Liberation Army. Official publications about the BDS simply use the expression “Chinese government” or “China”.

Furthermore, no official information on the governance structure of the BDS has been formally released, even though a general framework of BDS-related authorities can be drawn out through available open news reports and documents about the BDS. The key organizations involved in the BDS program are the following:

The China Satellite Navigation Committee (中国卫星导航系统委员会, hereinafter referred to as the CSNC). The CSNC seems to be the top decision making organ on the fundamental strategy and policy of the BDS and other Chinese PNT systems. On the one hand, the CSNC gives the opening address to the annual China Satellite Navigation Conference, which shows its important position in the supervisory framework of the BDS for domestic activities. On the other hand, the CSNC has also been working thus far as the leading authority for international cooperation involving the BDS. For example, the CSNC, on behalf of China and as the chairman of the Chinese side of China-Russia Cooperation Program Committee on Satellite Navigation, signed the “China’s BeiDou System and Russian GLONASS System Compatibility and Interoperability Cooperation Joint Statement” with the former Russian Federal Space Agency (currently known as the State Space Corporation ROSCOSMOS) in 2015.

The China Satellite Navigation Office (中国卫星导航系统管理办公室, CSNO). Under the leadership of the CSNC, the CSNO is in charge of the management work of the BDS. The CSNO is a joint office established by the competent governmental departments involved in BDS activities. For now, the CSNO is working on the system construction, application promotion, and industrialization of the BDS.

To aid in making scientific management and technical decisions, the CSNO is supported by its two internal branches, namely the Expert Committee and the Expert Teams. In addition, the CSNO is responsible for releasing top-level official policies and technical documents on the BDS both in Chinese and English as well as approving the documents on BDS-related performance and standard criteria. The CSNO also operates the official website of the BDS.

The Central Station for Satellite Navigation (卫星导航定位总站, hereinafter the CSSN). The CSSN is the Navigation Force under the leadership of Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission (formerly known as the General Staff Department of Chinese People’s Liberation Army). The CSSN was established as the agency for the management and operation of the BDS in 1999. Although the competence of the CSSN was described as “the research, demonstration, development, operation and application guarantee of the BDS,” it focuses more on the operation of the control segment comprising various ground stations of the BDS.

The China National Administration of GNSS and Applications (中国卫星导航定位应用管理中心, CNAGA). The CNAGA is the functional department for the application management of the BDS, which is contributing to promote the large-scale industrialization and international development of the BDS. Specifically, the CNAGA has an announced commitment to the following four aspects of the BDS:

• management of the operation and maintenance of the BDS, so as to ensure the successive and reliable provision of BDS services;
• supervision over the manufacturing enterprises of BDS user segments, so as to ensure the quality and safety of BDS services; 
• development of basic application criteria and critical infrastructure of the BDS, so as to consolidate the basis of application development; 
• the establishment of innovation platforms in terms of an industry alliance, industry base, industry forum and international cooperation for the BDS, so as to promote the communication and cooperation among businesses.

The National Technical Committee on BeiDou Satellite Navigation of the Standardization Administration of China (全国北斗卫星导航标准化技术委员会, hereinafter the NTCBDSSA). The NTCBDSSA was established in 2014 and is under the joint leadership of the Standardization Administration of the People’s Republic of China (SAC) and the Equipment Development Department of the Central Military Commission (formerly known as the General Armaments Department of Chinese People’s Liberation Army).

The NTCBDSSA is composed of 48 members, 7 observers and 3 liaisons, and the China Satellite Navigation Engineering Center (中国卫星导航工程中心) and the China Astronautics Standards Institute (中国航天标准化研究所) jointly comprise its secretariat. The competence scope of the NTCBDSSA covers the standardization activities concerning the management, construction, operation, application and service of the BDS. It is also in charge of developing civilian and military standards for the BDS both at the international and national level. However, all the standards proposed by the NTCBDSSA have to be approved by the CSNO before they come into force.

Based on the foregoing description, we may conclude that, in the context of the BDS, three main organizations have active roles: 1) the CSNO is responsible for the deployment and maintenance of the space segment, 2) the CSSN is operating the control segment, and 3) the CNAGA deals with supervision of the user segment, including the manufacturing of user receivers and the provision of PNT services.

In addition to these entities, as the BDS is a complicated system with interdisciplinary participation and cross-sectional dimension, many other authorities are involved in the management framework of the BDS. For example, the frequency protection of the BDS within the Chinese territory is under the responsibility of the Bureau of Radio Regulation of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of China, which is also known as the State Radio Office.

Policy and Law of the BDS
Different from its competitors in the domain of satellite navigation, particularly the EU and the United States, China owns a unique socialist system of laws with Chinese characteristics. China has recently placed great emphasis on the fundamental principle of governing the country by law. Accordingly, the rule of law has been proposed very frequently for China’s space industry.

However, China is still one of a few space powers that lacks a basic space law. Therefore, setting up a comprehensive legal framework for the BDS will arguably require some time. Until that can be achieved, a series of policy documents would have to retain the dominant role, even though policy solutions are much less effective than legal arrangements in the Chinese context. These include the following policy documents:

White Paper on China’s Space Activities. This white paper is currently the basic document relating to China’s space policy, and it always places great importance on the development of the BDS. The document has thus far been updated to the fourth version in 2016.

After summarizing certain achievements in the field of the BDS since 2006, the third version (2011) addresses the three-step strategy of the BDS and lists the BDS as one of the priority projects in key fields; the latest version (2016) requires the improvement of BDS applications and promotion of international cooperation of the BDS.

White Paper on China’s BeiDou Navigation Satellite System. This white paper was released in June 2016, which makes it the latest policy document concerning the BDS specifically. This white paper lays down the goals and principles related to the development of the BDS and again addresses the BDS three-step strategy.

According to the document, China is committed to ensuring the safe and reliable operation of the BDS and providing continuous, stable and reliable open services to users free of charge. In addition to protecting the utilization of the BDS frequency spectrum, the white paper also requires promotion of BDS applications and industrial development by taking multiple measures, as follows: 

• establishing an industrial supporting system, through making industrial policies, building equitable market environment, enhancing standardization process, and building a comprehensive service system of location data;
• establishing an industrial application promotion system, through improving the BDS application in key sectors related to national security and economy, pushing forward close integration of the BDS with state strategy on industrial and regional development, guiding mass market applications of the BDS in the fields of smart phones, vehicle-borne terminals, and wearable devices; 
• establishing an industrial innovative system, by enhancing the research and development of basic products based on the BDS, encouraging and supporting the construction of a technology innovation system that relies on the market players as the main factor combined with the efforts of academic institutes. The industrial system is called on to promote the integrated development of the BDS with infrastructures and technologies including the “Internet+”, “Big Data”, the “Internet of Things”, communications, remote sensing, and other emerging industries.

As for international cooperation of the BDS, the Chinese government plans to further the efforts by

• strengthening compatibility and joint applications with other navigation satellite systems;
• using frequency and orbital slot resources according to international rules, particularly the Radio Regulations by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU); 
• promoting the ratification of the BDS in accordance with international standards, particularly those of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the Third- Generation Mobile Communication Standard Partnership Project (Note that the BDS already gained recognition from the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in November 2014); 
• participating in multilateral activities in the field of international satellite navigation, such as the conferences and academic exchanges hosted by the International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (ICG); 
• promoting international applications of the BDS by intensifying publicity and popularization of the BDS, and implementing internationalization projects in the field of policy, market, law and finance, and so forth.

Medium and Long Term Development Plan for China’s Satellite Navigation Industry. This policy document was approved by the State Council and released by its General Office in September 2013. The Plan makes overall arrangements for medium- and long-term development of the BDS and other satellite navigation industry developments. The Plan first analyzes the current situation of satellite navigation that the BDS faces at home and abroad; second, it lays down the guidelines and principles to develop China’s navigation industry.

More importantly, the development plan indicates the year of 2020 as the critical timeline for China to form a new innovation-oriented development pattern. To achieve that goal, the development plan lays out six specific directions and tasks and five major projects to develop BDS-related industry before the year of 2020. Several measures are proposed to support this initiative.

Several Opinions on the Promotion of Geo-information Industry Development. This policy document was released by the General Office of the State Council in January 2014 with the purpose of promoting the development of China’s geo-information industry as a whole. Accordingly, the industry development of the BDS is an important element to allow the integration between geo-information and PNT services, which is recognized as an important way to facilitate people’s lives.

Several Opinions on Promotion and Application of the BeiDou Satellite Navigation System by China’s National Administration of Surveying, Mapping and Geo-information. This policy document was issued by China’s National Administration of Surveying, Mapping and Geo-information in March 2013, with the purpose of implementing the prior policy documents. This policy document obviously was made from the perspective of BDS users. It urges the competent regional authorities on surveying, mapping and geo-information to accelerate the promotion of application and industrialization of the BDS, and to safeguard China’s national security and interest within their competence.

Provisions of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army on the Administration of the Satellite Navigation Application. This military rule was issued by the former General Staff Department of Chinese People’s Liberation Army (currently known as Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission) and became effective on June 1, 2014. Although it has a lower status than “law” or “regulation”, this “rule” for now is the only legal-binding document in effect that relates directly and specifically to BDS applications.

The full text of this rule is not open to the public; however, the rule is known to be structured in 7 chapters, containing 36 articles, which specify the duties and responsibilities, programming and planning, application and approval, organizations, technical support, and security management regarding utilization of the BDS by Chinese military troops, particularly in combat situations.

In addition, some normative documents having no legal effect play an important role in the specific management of BDS-related activities. These documents are issued by

• the CNAGA, for example: Quality Management Provisions for BeiDou Civil Service, Authorized Management Methods of Quality Inspection Agencies for BeiDou Products, Performance Standard of Shipborne BeiDou Receiving Devices, and other authoritative information regarding BDS application management, certification of the BDS service and application, and inspection of BDS products’ quality;
• the CSNO, for example: BeiDou Navigation Satellite System Signal In Space Interface Control Document Open Service Signal, BeiDou Navigation Satellite System Open Service Performance Standard, Terminology for BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS), and 16 other standards prepared especially for the BDS.

Way Forward
Although China has made great achievements on the research, development, and construction of the BDS system, China’s deployment of the management of the BDS, including institutional, policy, and legal arrangements, is still in its infancy. This may, somewhat, clip the wings of its development, operations, and applications and may constrain its further popularization both at domestic and global level.

Although a vague governance structure has been delineated by the authors based on the currently available materials, the respective roles and responsibilities for the BDS still have to be well defined and disclosed in the form of law. The overlapping of responsibilities between the CSNO and the CNAGA should not be ignored. More importantly, a civilian-military coordination mechanism should be developed as soon as possible in order to promote the development of civil applications and to increase BDS commercialization both at internal and international level.

It is true that the strategy, goals, principles and action plans for the BDS are reflected by several policy documents, but none of them assigns specific tasks to each department; this inconsistency potentially compromises the implementation and enforceability of BDS policies in practice. Even though a law related to the BDS would be more legally binding than the planning and opinions that we have described here, only one classified military rule is available thus far for China’s GNSS program.

Fortunately, a regulation on satellite navigation proposed by the Equipment Development Department of the Central Military Commission has been listed into the Research Items of the State Council Legislative Workplan for 2016, as one of the of Legislative Projects Related to Implementing the National Security Strategy and to Protecting National Security. Even though the term “Research Items” represents low priority, at least it lights up the hope for a future legal regulation of the BDS.

Additional Resources
[1] BeiDou Satellite System (BDS), official website.
[2] China National Administration of GNSS and Applications, official website.
[3] China Satellite Navigation Office, Report on the Development of BeiDou Navigation Satellite System, Version 2.2, December 2013
[4] China Satellite Navigation Office, BeiDou Navigation Satellite System Open Service Performance Standard, Version 1.0, December 2013
[5] China Satellite Navigation Office, BeiDou Navigation Satellite System Signal In Space Interface Control Document Open Service Signal, Version 2.0, December 2013
[6] State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (Foreign Languages Press, 2016).

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This occasional feature by guest writers is coordinated by Ingo Baumann, co-founder and partner of BHO Legal in Cologne, Germany. His practice focuses on European high technology projects mainly in the space sector.

GNSS & The Law delves into the debates and developments around the new area of global satellite navigation system law.

This occasional feature by guest writers is coordinated by Ingo Baumann, co-founder and partner of BHO Legal in Cologne, Germany. His practice focuses on European high technology projects mainly in the space sector.

The post GNSS & the Law appeared first on Inside GNSS - Global Navigation Satellite Systems Engineering, Policy, and Design.

This year India entered the club of nations operating their own satellite navigation system. The Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS) has a constellation of seven satellites – three in geostationary orbit and four in geosynchronous orbit — that are currently functioning satisfactorily from their designated orbital positions.

The IRNSS series satellites were launched by the PSLV (Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle), developed and operated by Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO). ISRO used the PSLV-XL, an upgraded version boosted by more powerful, stretched strap-on boosters to achieve higher payload capability. Two additional satellites are planned as ground spares.

Upon the successful launch of the seventh satellite, IRNSS-1G, on April 28, 2016, the Indian Prime Minister renamed the system NAVIC, or Navigation with Indian Constellation. NAVIC is a Hindi word for sailor or navigator.

The NAVIC ground segment provides the monitoring of the constellation status, computation of the orbital and clock parameters, and navigation data uploading. It comprises tracking, telemetry, control, and uplink stations, a Spacecraft Control Center, an IRNSS Timing Center, CDMA ranging stations, a Navigation Control Center, and data communication links.

IRNSS provides two types of services, the standard positioning service (SPS) and the restricted service (RS). Signals can be received with a single-frequency receiver for Standard Positioning Service (SPS), dual-frequency receiver for both SPS and RS service, and a multi-mode receiver compatible with other GNSS providers.

NAVIC’s main goal is to provide India with reliable position, navigation and timing (PNT) services through an independent system for national applications. However, the coverage area also includes neighboring countries (up to 1.500 kilometers from its border). India’s prime minister has invited the member states of SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), which include Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, the Maldives, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, to make use of NAVIC. An Extended Service Area would cover the rectangle from latitude 30 degrees South to 50 degrees North, and Longitude 30 degrees East to 130 degrees East.

NAVIC applications include terrestrial, aerial and marine navigation; disaster management, vehicle tracking and fleet management, integration with mobile phones, precise timing, mapping and navigation for hikers and drivers.

According to an article in The Times of India on April 5, 2014, the impetus for an independent national system is said to have originated from the Kargil War in 1999, when the United States reportedly denied India vital satellite information. (See also the article “How Kargil War with Pak Propelled India to Elite Space Club,” in the Deccan Chronicle, April 29, 2016. Available here.

“Until now we were dependent on their systems, now we are self-reliant,” Prime Minister Narendra Modi said in a televised congratulatory message to scientists at ISRO upon the last NAVIC launch that completed the IRNSS constellation. Further political statements underlined the fact that the whole system has been developed and produced in India.

Legislative Framework
Even though IRNSS is strategically important to India, no dedicated legal framework exists governing use of the system. Although India has ratified all major international space treaties, including the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, 1968 Rescue Agreement, 1972 Liability Convention, and 1975 Registration Convention, no specific laws regulate the country’s space activities. However, India’s Constitution, Article 51, provides the foundation for implementing obligations arising from the international space treaties.

For the last five decades, space activities are completely within the government’s realm. The Allocation of Business Rules, laid under Article 77(3) of Indian Constitution, has provided the nation’s Space Department with the authority to regulate all programs related to space science, technology, and applications, which are largely executed by the Indian Space Research Organization, ISRO.

Until now, India has had little need for dedicated national space legislation. However, with completion of NAVIC/IRNSS and considering the increasing commercialization of space worldwide and the potential future participation of private industry in Indian space programs, new discussions on national space legislation have recently been initiated.

A step in this direction came with a workshop on national space legislation organized by ISRO in mid-January 2015. Six months later, the National Law School of India University, Bangalore, organized a round table conference on national space legislation. Conference attendees drafted a one-page document, the “Bangalore Declaration,” proposing the minimum content of potential future national space legislation.

However, the draft legislation is not yet public. The military, which is scrutinizing the document, will forward it to the Ministry of External Affairs once the vetting is complete, according to a February 29, 2016, article in the Deccan Herald.

This year, the Ministry of Home Affairs proposed a Geospatial Information Regulation Bill to regulate the acquisition, dissemination, publication and distribution of geospatial information in India. Titled the Geospatial Information Regulation Bill, the draft measure has received a lot of attention, both in India and abroad, but has been criticized for its highly restrictive approach.

The draft bill, according to its Article 37, will not apply to Indian government agencies. Instead, the Indian national government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, exempt from the provisions of the act ministries, departments, public sector enterprises, or any other attached or subordinate offices of the central or state governments. Should the bill be approved we could expect such exemptions will be declared for ISRO, the operation of the NAVIC system, and the provision of its services.

Currently, India’s space policy framework mainly consists of two documents, the 2000 SATCOM policy and the 2011 Remote Sensing Data Policy (RSDP). However, neither are applicable to satellite navigation.

The SATCOM document addresses policy implementation for nationwide satellite communications. The RSDP establishes the modalities for permitting and/or managing remote sensing data acquisition to support development activities.

NAVIC Interface Control Document
In June 2014, ISRO released the IRNSS Signal-in-Space Interface Control Document (ICD) for SPS. The document provides essential information to facilitate research and development and aid the commercial use of the IRNSS signals for navigation-based applications. It addresses signal modulations, frequency bands, received power levels, data structures, user algorithms, and similar subjects.

However, in contrast to ICD documents for other satellite navigation systems such as the Europe’s Galileo, the IRNSS document does not include any legal provisions, particularly regarding licenses of the ICD to use for building receivers or other types of equipment. The document only mentions that ISRO does not give any assurance on the fitness of the information furnished in the document for any specific purpose.

The document appears to be for information-only use. ISRO does not assume liability for any product’s development based on the information. Moreover, no liability is assumed for any consequences from the use of the information contained in the IRNSS SIS ICD for SPS. Further, the ICD “shall not be reproduced or transmitted, partly or wholly, in electronic or print medium without the consent of the publishing authority.”

The IRNSS SIS ICD for SPS could be subject to modification and update. Although the government said it would make its best effort to notify the public about updates of the ICD, it does not assume any obligation to advise any person or organization about such updates.

Envisaged Procurement for IRNSS Spare Satellites
Thus far, ISRO has built and launched the NAVIC constellation on its own. However, according to a September 2, 2016 article in The Hindu newspaper, ISRO is finalizing plans to procure two spare navigation satellites to be built by industry in the next two years.

According to the article, the first spare satellite will be built by March 2017 with ISRO’s oversight. However, the second spare satellite, expected a year later, will be built entirely by industry, according to M. Annadurai, ISRO Satellite Center director.

While the decision to procure NAVIC satellites from industry is an important step towards more involvement of private industry in India’s space programs, it will not change the public character of the NAVIC system. Its operations and service provision will remain under the responsibility of ISRO.

Reflections on India’s Dedicated Space Legislation
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty imposes international responsibility upon countries for their activities in space. This article applies regardless of whether the activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities. As a major “Launching State” for spacecraft, India bears “unlimited liability in time and quantum” for damage caused by its space objects.

The Outer Space Treaty also requires non-governmental entities to obtain “authorization and continuing supervision” for their activities, which is seen as the basis for national space legislation but does not necessarily demand it. NAVIC, operated by ISRO as a government system, has no need for implementing dedicated space legislation, even given the procurement of spare satellites.

The space treaties establish liability for damages caused by space objects. However, it is recognized that the treaties do not regulate the provision of signals in space or space services, including those from satellite navigation systems. As of today, no specific international legal instrument governs liability for navigational satellite signals and services, and, as mentioned earlier, India presently does not have a specific legal regime in place.

One major legal issue is the potential liability of the government toward users and third parties arising from NAVIC signal and service interruptions or degradations. The Airport Authority of India (AAI) Act of 1994 (as amended in 2003), pursuant to the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, established the AAI as the service provider of aeronautical navigation facilities. Section 33 of the Act grants immunity to AAI and its officers from prosecution for action that result in damage or loss to users.

As far as services and applications designated for the general public are concerned, however, other laws and relevant jurisdiction may come into play. Another related aspect is industry’s potential liability for NAVIC-based downstream services and applications. The following sections examine two relevant cases addressing this issue.

Deficiency in Services under Consumer Protection Act of 1986
Section 2(1)(d) of India’s1986 Consumer Protection Act (CPA) defines two categories of consumers as any person, who:

(i) buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any user of such goods other than the person who buys such goods for consideration paid or promised or partly paid or partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment, when such use is made with the approval of such person, but does not include a person who obtains such goods for resale or for any commercial purpose; or

(ii) hires or avails of any services for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any beneficiary of such services other than the person who hires or avails of the services for consideration paid or promised, or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment, when such services are availed of with the approval of the first mentioned person but does not include a person who avails of such services for any commercial purpose.

For the present discussion, the second category of the definition is relevant as it relates to service provisions. It also includes the beneficiary of services hired or made use of. Although “consumer” does not include a person who avails him- or herself of services for any commercial purposes, the CPA indicates that use of NAVIC services taken for the purposes of earning livelihood by self-employment would be covered by the definition. To illustrate, a railway operator or airline making use of satellite navigation signals may not qualify as a consumer, but a taxi driver or bus driver using NAVIC signals or services would fall into the second category.

Section 2(1)(o) of the CPA defines “service,” as “service of any description which is made available to potential users . . . that is not free of charge or under contract of personal services” Furthermore, “[a]ny fault, imperfection, shortcoming or inadequacy in the quality, nature and manner of performance which is required to be maintained by or under any law for the time being in force or has been undertaken to be performed by a person in pursuance of a contract or otherwise in relation to any service has been deemed to be considered as ‘deficiency in services.’” [CPA, Section 2(1)(g)]

It may be argued that where NAVIC signals are provided free of charge to the users, the CPA may not be of any relief to those suffering damage. Because NAVIC’s intended objective is commercial use for downstream services and applications, however, in the absence of any specific legislation defining liabilities and responsibilities of satellite navigation service providers, victims of deficient service or a defective signal may find recourse under the CPA.

Free usage has been interpreted in a unique way in the case of Geetha Jethani v. Airport Authority of India and Ors. The facts of the case are as follows: Jyotsna Jethani, an eight-year-old girl, was crushed to death when she was sucked into an escalator due to some defect or fault in the escalator. The defect in the escalator was allegedly due to poor maintenance.

Jyotsna’s mother, Geetha Jethani, filed a lawsuit under the CPA against AAI, alleging deficiency in service, and claiming compensation for irreparable loss.

AAI contended that it was granted immunity under section 33 of the AAI Act, claiming that the family could not be viewed as an AAI consumer because the complainant had not hired or availed herself of any service from the AAI and no fee was charged by AAI from incoming passengers for the use of the escalators.

The Apex Consumer Court (National Commission) rejected AAI’s arguments, holding the Authority liable for “deficiency in services” within the ambit of CPA. The court noted that a deficiency had occurred because AAI had not duly maintained the escalator, which was a statutory function. Moreover, as thou-sands of passengers used these services, AAI had an additional duty of care for safety.

Although use of the escalator may not be termed as being free, the court held that, according to section 22 of the AAI Act, the AAI does have the power to charge fees for any other service or facility offered in connection with the aircraft operation at any airport or for providing air traffic services or for amenities given to the passengers. Furthermore, the free service provided to incoming passengers is covered by services rendered to outgoing passengers who pay entry fees and other kind of fees.

The Apex Consumer Court relied on the precedence set in the case of Indian Medical Association v. V. P. Shantha wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India had held that when service is offered on payment to some person as well as free to some others, it would fall within the ambit of the expression service as defined in Section 2(1)(o) of the Act, irrespective of the fact that the service is rendered free of charge to persons who do not pay for such service. Free service would also be service and the recipient a consumer under the Act.

Thus, legal precedent has been established in India to pierce the veil of immunity from prosecution embodied in Section 33 of the AAI Act and to bring the AAI within the purview of CPA.

Similarly, the courts have held that damage suffered due to excessive electricity voltage (Gujarat SEB Ltd. v. Zora Singh) or inordinate and unexplained delay in providing electricity supply to residential flat (Alarcity Foundation Ltd. v. T. N. Electricity Board and Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam v. Bodan Ram) rep-resented a “deficiency in service” within the meaning of CPA. Thus, ample precedence has been established for compensating for deficiency in “services,” which the courts in India might likely take with respect to NAVIC services. Victims of faulty signals who do not fall within the definition of “consumer” may come under the jurisdiction of other statutory adjudicatory authorities. In the case of any commercial dispute or breach of contractual obligation, recourse is also open to appropriate courts in India or even to arbitration.

Lesson from the Call Drop Case
As reported in the Hindustan Times, on May 11, 2016, the call dropping case adjudicated in Cellular Operators Association of India and Ors. v. Telecom Regulatory Authority of India and Ors. reflects consumer’s high expectations for the precision sought from telecom service providers. The calls, which automatically get disconnected due to network issues, are one of the biggest problems for the 900 million or so Indian mobile subscribers. The independent Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) regulates the telecommunications business in India. TRAI regulations as amended in 2015 demand that telecom operators compensate their customers for dropped calls at the rate of one rupee per dropped call to a maximum of three dropped calls per consumer.

The Cellular Operators Association of India challenged the amended regulation in the High Court of Delhi. The High Court, which upheld the regulation, said the regulation was an exercise of power under the TRAI Act, keeping in mind the paramount interest of the consumer. Aggrieved by the High Court’s decision, the Cellular Operators Association, along with Unified Telecom Service Providers of India and 21 other telecom operators, filed an appeal with India’s Supreme Court. Interestingly, the Apex Court struck down this compensation policy for call drops because the regulation was unconstitutional and arbitrary, prompting a large sigh of relief from the telecom service providers.

Although the decision was a big relief for telecom service providers, the Apex Court only questioned the TRAI’s process of arriving at the call-drop decision. The court considered the regulation ultra vires (beyond the powers) of TRAI and did not deny the merits of call drop case. It also ruled that Parliament can make and enact a call-drop compensation rule. Consumers obviously have zero tolerance for failure in network services, which will likely prompt future legislation prescribing penalties on providers for deficient services.

“While I acknowledge the mobile operators for bringing connectivity to the nook and corner of the country, it is equally their responsibility to give good, satisfactory service,” said Ravi Shankar Prasad, India minister for communications and information technology, as quoted in the Business Standard on May 12, 2016. “They must identify the gap and reinforce it through investment. Since July, they have added about 90,000 sites in the country, [with] 5,000 in Delhi. They need to do more, and the government will continue to insist upon the operators that they must fulfill this obligation.”

Since the call-drop decision, telecom service providers have acknowledged that they are accountable to consumers and other stakeholders, including the government, for the deficiencies in the network. Drawing an analogy from the call-drop case, legal issues may arise in the near future with commercial application of navigation satellites wherein a consumer would like to be compensated for deficiency in services. An independent regulatory body similar to TRAI would therefore be very much needed to regulate satellite navigation service providers to ensure service quality and a fair and transparent policy environment that promotes and facilitates fair competition.

Conclusions
India has recently completed its own regional satellite navigation system. ISRO is planning to procure, for the first time, additional spare satellites from industry.

However, India currently has no specific space activities legislation or laws or regulations for the provision of satellite navigation signals and services. While initial discussions on national space legislation have been initiated, no draft legislation has appeared thus far. A separate draft bill for Geospatial Information Regulation is currently under discussion. However, it would not apply to the governmental operation of the NAVIC system. The same is true as regards authorization procedures for the space activities of non-governmental entities to be established under future national space legislation.

As for other satellite navigation programs, government liability for signals and services, provided by satellite navigation systems, is a core legal issue that needs to be considered further, particularly for promotion of NAVIC downstream applications and services. Even though the Supreme Court’s ruling on call drops is final, the issue has not been fully resolved. Considering emerging commercial downstream services and applications based on NAVIC, the case must be seen as a beacon illuminating the complex legal issues arising from potential claims of users and third parties. In conjunction with the prospective National Space Act and the draft Geospatial Information Regulation bill, India should further reflect on the legal issues related to satellite navigation signals and services.

Additional Resources
1. Alarcity Foundation Ltd. v. T. N. Electricity Board, 1 CPR 194, 1993
2. Business Standard, May 12, 2016
3. Cellular Operators Association of India and Ors. v. Telecom Regulatory Authority of India and Ors, AIR SC 2336, 2016
4. Deccan Chronicle, “How Kargil War with Pak Propelled India to Elite Space Club,” April 29, 2016 (available online here)
5. Deccan Herald, “First Indian Space Law Being Vetted by Military,” February 29, 2016
6. Geetha Jethani v. Airport Authority of India and Ors 2004 (3) CPJ 106 (NC)
7. Gujarat SEB Ltd. v. Zora Singh, 6 SCC 776, 2005
8. Hindustan Times, “It’s Unreasonable: SC Strikes Down Call Drop Penalty on Operators” May 11, 2016
9. Hobe, S., and B. Schmidt-Tedd, K. Schrogl, C. Verlag, Cologne, Commentary on Space Law, Volume 1, p.120, 2009
10. Indian Medical Association v. V. P. Shantha (1995) 6 SCC 651
11. Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam v. Bodan Ram, 2003 (4) CPJ 101(NC)
12. Kaul, R., and R. S Jakhu, “Regulation of Space Activities in India,” National Regulation of Space Activities, Springer Publication, p. 192, 2010
13. Lesley Jane Smith, “Legal Aspects of Satellite Navigation” in Handbook of Space Law, p.554 – 617
14. Parliament of India, Consumer Protection Act, 1986
15. Rao, R. V., and K. Abhijeet, Commercialization and Privatization of Space: Issues for National Space Legislation, Knowledge World Publishers, Annex 3, 2016
16. Telecom Consumers Protection (Ninth Amendment) Regulations, No. 301/2015-F&EA, 2015
17. The Hindu, “Industry to Build ISRO’s Two Spare Navigation Satellites,” September 2, 2016
18. The Times of India, “How Kargil Spurred India to Design Own GPS,” April 5, 2014 (available online here)

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Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and a discussion of privacy in the United States typically begins with the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” In U.S. v Katz, the U.S. Supreme Court found that this Fourth Amendment protection created an individual’s constitutional right to privacy.

Justice Harlan’s concurrent opinion in Katz set forth what has come to be known as the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test to determine whether an individual’s privacy has been violated. The test consists of two prongs. First, the judicial system must determine whether an individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy. This is the objective component of the test. The second component is subjective: assessing whether society is prepared to recognize such an expectation as “reasonable.” A person satisfies both prongs if he or she has taken steps to show an expectation of privacy, and if society recognizes those expectations as reasonable under the circumstances.

Although the privacy protections of the Fourth Amendment are only applicable to the federal government, the concept is often more broadly applied to include commercial settings. For example, the legal system has generally believed that individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when in public.

This belief is based in part upon two 1986 U.S. Supreme Court decisions involving remote sensing technology. In Dow Chemical Co. v U.S, the court found that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) did not violate Dow Chemical’s Fourth Amendment rights when it used an airplane, without obtaining a warrant, to collect aerial photographs to inspect the company’s premises under the Clean Air Act. The court found that the EPA did not infringe either prong of the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test when it flew over the company’s property — even though the property was surrounded by a fence. Similarly, in California v Ciraolo, the Supreme Court ruled that the data obtained from a plane hired by the police to fly over a private home, again without a warrant, could be used in a trial.

The geospatial community has relied upon Dow Chemical and its progeny to support the position that the use of remote sensing technology to collect data of public spaces is generally immune from privacy concerns. However, several recent developments in the United States suggest that the courts, policy makers, regulators, and the public are beginning to believe that some expectation of privacy in public are reasonable.

An example is the Supreme Court’s decision in U.S. v Jones. In Jones, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether law enforcement was required to obtain a warrant before using a tracking device — in this case, a GPS receiver and cellular modem combination — to monitor an individual’s movements in public. The Supreme Court found that the act of placing a device on an automobile without a warrant was a violation of the suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights under what many considered to be an archaic theory of trespass.

In their concurring and dissenting opinions, however, a majority of the justices also appeared to suggest that long-term tracking of an individual’s movements in public can violate Fourth Amendment rights. This concept, generally referred to as the “mosaic theory,” suggests that continuous government collection of information about an individual could infringe on that person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.

As a leading source of positioning data, GNSS — operating alone and in combination with other geolocation technologies — will figure prominently in many privacy-related legal matters.

Remote Sensing Technology
Privacy concerns associated with remote sensing data were further highlighted in a May 2014 White House report, titled “Big Data: A Technological Perspective” (the “Big Data Report’). The report was prepared by the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, a group of leading scientists and engineers who make policy recommendations to the president on important technology issues. One of the topics addressed in the report was the privacy risk associated with “born analog” data – i.e., digitized information originally created in a non-digital format arising “from the characteristics of the physical world” that becomes accessible electronically when it “impinges upon a ‘sensor.’”

According to the Big Data Report, one of the privacy concerns associated with “born-analog datasets is that they “likely contain more information than the minimum necessary for their immediate purpose.” (“Data minimization” — collecting the minimum amount of information required to perform the task at hand — is one of the tenets of privacy protection around the world.) While the report acknowledges that a number of technological and business reasons exists for such collection to occur, the authors suggest that inherent privacy risks arise with such an approach. For example, “[a] consequence is that born-analog data will often contain information that was not originally expected. Unexpected information could in many cases lead to unanticipated beneficial products and services, but it could also give opportunities for unanticipated misuse.”

The Big Data Report describes various types of “personal information” created by born-analog data. Many types of such data are quite familiar to the remote-sensing community, including “(i) video from . . . overhead drones; (ii) imaging infrared video; and (iii) synthetic aperture radar (SAR)”.

The report also identifies privacy risks associated with LIDAR. While acknowledging that the technology is important to governments, industry, and a broad range of academic disciplines, the report notes that“[s]cene extraction is an example of inadvertent capture of personal information and can be used for data fusion to reveal personal information.”

Drones
In addition to remote sensing, the Big Data Report cites privacy risks associated with “precise geolocation in imagery from satellites and drones,” also known as unmanned aerial systems (UAS). The advent of UAS or drones prompted changes in perception about a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy while in public. For example, several states have passed legislation that restricts the use of drones to collect information about an individual on private property, even if the same information could be collected by a manned aircraft.

Many of these restrictions apply to the use of drones by state agencies for law enforcement. However, others pertain to private use of drones, including by commercial entities. At the federal level, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) brought together stakeholders from the industry, academia, and civil rights organizations to develop voluntary “best practices” for commercial use of drones. These best practices restrict the collection of high resolution images capable of identifying an individual while in public without an individual’s permission.

While the NTIA’s best practices are voluntary, and apply solely to drones, we might reasonably expect that privacy proponents soon will push the concept to other remote sensing platforms. For example, the NTIA has conducted a similar multi-stakeholder initiative for facial recognition technology. More recently, the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) released imagery collected by the FBI from manned aircraft of protestors in Baltimore in 2015. (The imagery had been obtained by the ACLU under Freedom of Information Act requests.)

We should expect privacy advocates to begin to argue that such imagery highlights the fact that manned aircraft are capable of creating many of the same type of privacy risks as drones and should be subject to similar restrictions. Members of the legal community have also begun to discuss whether privacy restrictions should apply to satellites. In fact, the International Bar Association recently proposed a Convention on Geoinformation that would affect all types of remote sensing activities.

Personally Identifiable Information & Data Fusion
Personally identifiable information (PII) is generally defined as information that can be used to identify an individual, either on its own or when combined with other information. Such PII as social security numbers, credit card information, email addresses, and health records have been subject to regulatory and legal protection in the United States for some time.

Until recently, geoinformation has been immune from such oversight. However, this is beginning to change as the privacy community begins to recognize the power of aggregating location with other non-PII to identify an individual. The pressure to regulate geoinformation will grow as technology makes it simpler and cheaper to aggregate and visualize it with other types of Big Data.

For example, one of the increased concerns that the Big Data Report cites is the increased power of data fusion in connection with born-analog data. Data fusion is the concept of aggregating a variety of data sets in order to develop correlations and to create profiles. The concern with data fusion is that otherwise anonymous information can be used to create a profile so unique that it can be used to identify an individual with a high degree of accuracy. To quote from the report:

“Data fusion occurs when data from different sources are brought into contact and new facts emerge (See section 3.2.2). Individually, each data source may have a specific limited purpose. Their combination, however, may uncover new meanings. In particular, data fusion can result in the identification of individual people, the creation of profiles of an individual and the tracking of an individual’s activities. More broadly, data analytics discovers patterns and correlations in large corpuses of data, using increasingly powerful statistical algorithms. If those data include personal data, the inferences flowing from data analytics may then be mapped backed to inferences, both certain and uncertain about individuals.”

The privacy risks associated with data fusion should be of particular concern to the geospatial community, as lawmakers, policymakers and courts are starting to realize the power of location. For example, a number of states now restrict the collection of a zip code at the point of sale in a credit card transaction because the information can be aggregated to identify an individual without his or her consent. Similarly, the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) was amended in 2013 to require parental consent before collecting “geolocation information sufficient to identify street name and name of a city or town.”

In June 2016, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), settled with the mobile advertising network inMobi for collecting geolocation information on consumers without their consent. This information was obtained by geocoding a consumer’s location using Wi-Fi hotspots that inMobi had mapped. A blog post on the FTC website explained that this allowed inMobi to “infer and track location without consent and regardless of a consumer’s location setting.”

Consequences for the Geospatial Community
It would be a mistake to dismiss these matters as isolated events. Rather, due to the courts’, lawmakers’, and citizens’ increasing concerns about privacy in a digital world, such legal and regulatory developments reflect a larger, global trend that is affecting a wide range of technology platforms. The change is already affecting organizations that are tapping into the power of location for a wide range of applications. For example, law enforcement’s use of cellphone tracking technology has been challenged in the courts on a number of occasions. While the government has prevailed in several of these cases, they have lost others involving the use of stingray technology, which spoofs cell phone towers in order to track an individual’s mobile device.

These court decisions are based upon very detailed analysis of particular sections of U.S. law and not fundamental principles of location privacy, which will make it harder for users of geoinformation to know which applications are permitted and which are barred.

Similarly, the GNSS-aided Pokemon Go app has recently raised concerns about location privacy implications. Given the game’s great popularity, one can expect others to develop similar apps, with increased attention to the privacy implications. As a result, the geospatial community should prepare for more scrutiny in the United States about how geoinformation is collected and used.

Additional Resources
[1] Lewis, J. J., and L. R. Caplan, “Drones to Satellites: Should Commercial Aerial Data Collection Regulations Differ by Altitude?’ GovCon Insider, September 1, 2015
[2] Meyer, R., “This Very Common Cellphone Surveillance Still Doesn’t Require a Warrant,” The Atlantic (online), April 14, 2016
[3] Office of U.S. Senator Al Franken, “Sen. Franken Presses Makers of ‘Pokemon GO’ Smartphone App Over Privacy Concerns,” press release, July 12, 2016 [accessed here, August 27, 2016]
[4] President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, “Big Data and Privacy: A Technological Perspective,” Report to the President, May 2014[5] Rees, C., “How the IBA Is Facilitating the Development of ‘Information Law,’” International Bar Association, May 16, 2013 [accessed here, August 27, 2016]
[5] TechDirt (online), “Maryland Court Says Cops Need Warrants To Deploy Stingray Devices,” April 8, 2016 [accessed here, on August 27, 2016]
[6] Wessler, N. F., and N. Dwork, “FBI Releases Secret Spy Plane Footage From Freddie Gray Protests,” American Civil Liberties Union, Speak Freely blog, August 4, 2016 [accessed here, on August 27, 2016]

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Japan’s regional and augmentation positioning system, the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS), is a project yet to be developed. While it will become a constellation of seven satellites covering the western Pacific area, only “Michibiki,” the first satellite launched in 2010 for technological validation , is now in orbit.

Still, a reading of the government’s most recent Basic Plan on Space Policy reveals that it is one of the principal space projects of Japan. According to that plan, a constellation of four satellites will be in place by the end of fiscal year 2017, and three more satellites will be added to the constellation by 2023.

The operator of the satellites is, and will remain, the Japanese government. Since a Cabinet decision on September 30, 2011, the Cabinet Administration Office (CAO) has been responsible for the development, maintenance and operation of the QZSS. The National Space Policy Secretariat of the CAO is the section responsible for space policy, including the operation of the QZSS. The CAO has already procured three satellites to be launched by 2017 through a public bid.

The ground segment of the system, including the daily command and control of the satellites, was distinguished from the satellites and procured from the private sector by a private finance initiative (PFI) scheme. (The PFI Act of 1999 allowed public/private partnership arrangements in which private companies construct, renovate, and sometimes manage public infrastructure.)

The CAO invited bids for the ground segment in December 2012. NEC Corporation, a Japanese multinational information technology company and satellite manufacturer, was selected as the provider of the service.

The NEC group then incorporated Quasi-Zenith Satellite System Services Inc. (QSS), which became the contractor. The scope of business of QSS Inc. is promoting, improving and managing the ground system through 2032.

The scheme specified in the procurement conditions was “build, own and operate (BOO).” Therefore, QSS as contractor owns the facilities and is responsible for their renewal and maintenance, when necessary. Although the PFI Act allows contractors to charge a fee for services if it is allowed under the procurement conditions, no clause on such service is included in the contract for QZSS.

QZSS Concept: Its Origin and Development
The QZSS is a regional navigation satellite system that will augment and complement the U.S. Global Positioning System because QZSS signals are compatible with those of GPS. So in this sense, QZSS adds “extra satellites” to the NAVSTAR GPS constellation. At the same time, QZSS will send augmentation signals that improve the precision of GPS positioning. In this latter sense, it will serve as an augmentation system.

The project is based on the idea that three satellites forming a constellation in geosynchronous orbit on different planes will enable at least one of them to be observed from Japan near zenith all the time. The near-zenith position is emphatically suited to Japan, a mountainous country with cities crowded with tall buildings. A satellite on the low elevation angle would not be observable either in urban or rural areas. Once the constellation is in full operation seven years from now, four of them will always be observable from Japan. Positioning then will become possible solely by QZSS, without relying on GPS (or any other GNSS).

The project was initially proposed by the Keidanren, the Japanese Business Federation of national companies and associations, in 2001 The Cabinet-level Council for Science and Technology (now Council for Science, Technology and Innovation) endorsed the proposal in a report by a specialized committee in 2004.

In the beginning, the cost of the project was to be shared 50/50 by the government and private sector, which was loosely called a public-private partnership (PPP). The business sector expected that QZSS satellites would at the same time be available for telecommunication and broadcasting services. Consequently, the Advanced Space Business Corporation (ASBC) was formed with investment from across the whole industry. However, it soon turned out that telecommunication and broadcasting by satellites would probably not be competitive against equivalent services and the enthusiasm of the business sector for QZSS quickly waned.

Nonetheless, the project survived. The ASBC was dissolved, but the Space Positioning Research and Application Center (SPAC) was formed as a kind of its successor, focusing exclusively on positioning services. At the same time, the government started to take on larger responsibility. The Cabinet decision of 2011 confirmed it, and the project regained its momentum.

With this background, Japan has participated with all of the world’s other GNSS providers in the United Nations-sponsored International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (ICG). Japan hosted the ICG’s sixth annual meeting in Tokyo in 2011.

Legal Framework for QZSS
Under Japanese law, both space-specific laws and general laws are applicable to the QZSS.

The first to mention is the Basic Space Law of 2008, which sets forth a number of overarching state policies and stipulates six “basic principles” of Japanese space policy, namely, peaceful use of outer space, improvement of the lives of the citizenry, advancement of industries, development of human society, international cooperation, and consideration for the environment.

Under “improvement in the lives of the citizenry” the 2008 law mentions the “promotion of information systems on positioning,” in addition to satellite-based telecommunication and observation systems, and mandates the government to take measures necessary to achieve them.

As of April 2016, the bill concerning launch and control of satellites is tabled before the Diet, Japan’s bicameral legislature. The bill, sometimes called the Japanese “Space Activities Law,” provides a regulatory regime for space activities by private entities.

However, even after the bill is approved by the Diet and is enforced as the law, it will not be applicable to QZSS, because it does not regulate space activities (control of satellites) by the government. The ground segment alone will not qualify as a space activity as defined in the bill.

Among the general laws applicable to the QZSS is the Basic Act on the Advancement of Utilizing Geospatial Information (the so-called National Spatial Data Infrastructure (NSDI) Law of 2007). It provides a general framework for the use of geospatial information, again with the nature of declaring a policy program.

Two provisions of the NSDI Law specifically refer to satellite positioning. One of them mandates the government to take necessary measures to advance use of geospatial information through highly reliable positioning satellite services, while the other requires the government to proceed with technological research and development feasibility studies concerning satellite positioning, as well as to promote its application.

Finally, the signals emitted from the QZSS satellites are governed by the Radio Act. This protects QZSS signals from unlawful interference, in particular jamming or spoofing. To be more specific, any user of a device that transmits radio waves may not disturb the function of other radio equipment. Otherwise a license to operate a radio station will not granted. As a result, any person spoofing or jamming the QZSS signals, whether either a radio operator without a license or in breach of the conditions of the license, shall be considered in violation of the law. The penal sanction includes imprisonment of up to one year and/or a fine of up to one million yen (less than US$10,000.)

International Framework
The interference of radio waves is also a matter of international concern. Prior to the development of QZSS, Japan and the United States collaborated on development of Japan’s GPS augmentation system, the Multi-functional Transport Satellite-based Satellite Augmentation System (MSAS). The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) administers MSAS. The two governments issued a Joint Statement on Cooperation in the Use of the Global Positioning System in 1998.

Regular consultation meetings have been held almost annually since then, and the collaboration has proven useful to the development of QZSS. The U.S. government has supported the development of QZSS by Japan through these consultation meetings. Under the framework of consultation meetings working groups have been established to ensure compatibility and interoperability of GPS and QZSS. After MSAS terminates its service, which is anticipated to be around 2020, QZSS will replace it as Japan’s satellite based augmentation system (SBAS) for GPS.

Privacy Issues and Potential Concerns of Users
From the users’ side, positioning by satellites is convenient, but also raises concerns about the privacy, which is actually already a problem because all the smart phones and mobile phones sold in Japan are equipped with a GPS signal receiver.

Legally, the privacy issue must be considered on several levels under Japanese law. The basis of the privacy is Japan’s Constitution. Although the Constitution which has not been amended since its adoption in 1947, does not mention privacy explicitly, the courts have held that the right to privacy is included in “the right to pursue personal happiness,” which is one of the basic human rights declared in Article 13 of the Constitution.

When a person alleges infringement of his or her privacy and claims damages, however, the Constitution cannot be the basis of the claim as such. The alleged victim must raise either a tort claim under the Civil Code (when the claim is against a private party) or a claim under the State Compensation Act (when the claim is against the national or local government). The Constitution can support such a claim as embodying the underlying value.

Furthermore, in the context of satellite positioning, two statutes are relevant. One is the Act on Personal Data Protection, which imposes some specific duties on those who collect information that can identify individuals (“personal information”). Whether that personal information falls under the privacy concept protected by the Constitution or not, the stipulated duties to protect personal data must be complied with.

The other privacy-related statute is the Act on Telecommunication Services, which regulates telecommunication service providers. One of the providers’ duties is to respect the secrecy of communication — another fundamental human right protected under Article 21 (2) of the Constitution. Although the Constitution is addressed to the government, the Act on Telecommunication Services extends the duty to private parties, namely service providers.

Against these backgrounds, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) issued Guidelines on the Protection of Personal Information in the Telecommunications Business, most recently amended in June 2015. The guidelines are accompanied by explanatory notes.

As regards the dissemination to a third party of the personal positioning information obtained from a user of a mobile device, the guidelines allow this only if the user has given consent or the judge has issued a warrant. Because positioning information from mobile devices is constantly obtained and recorded by the telecommunication service provider, even when the user does not make a call, it may not (necessarily) fall under the “secrecy of communication.” Therefore, the guidelines require providers to protect user privacy in general as a human right.

When a telecommunication service provider does share positioning information with a third party (recipient), it must “take necessary measures” to prevent infringement on the user’s right. The explanatory notes clarify that the necessary measures include (i) the user’s consent, (ii) alert for the users, by indication on the screen or otherwise, (iii) security against unauthorized access to the information and (iv) ensuring respect for the users’ privacy by, for example, appropriate arrangements with the recipient.

Further, the guidelines provide that the telecommunication service provider is permitted to obtain personal positioning information either upon a request of the police and in accordance with a warrant issued by a judge or upon request of the rescuing agency if the person is in serious and imminent danger.

The positioning information obtained from a user making a call is considered “sender’s information” and is treated differently. Such information is covered by the rules governing secrecy of communication. In principle, the telecommunication service provider shall not disclose the sender’s information except when necessary for its service (such as when the receiver requests its disclosure). Still, cases may arise in which the disclosure of a sender’s information will be justified, such as when (i) the user (sender) has given consent, (ii) the judge has issued a warrant, (iii) the police request the location of the sender in a case of criminal blackmailing by telephone (such as a call from a kidnapper) or (iv) a person makes an emergency call notifying authorities or service providers about an imminent threat to someone’s safety.

These guidelines are relevant to signals from any satellite system, whether GPS or QZSS. However, the owner or operator of the QZSS satellites is not a telecommunication service provider, nor is QSS Inc., the operator of the ground facility. Therefore, neither are subject to the guidelines.

Police Use of GPS Receivers
Law enforcement officers engaged in the investigation of a crime may prefer to place a GPS receiver on a suspect’s car to track its movements rather than acquire positioning information from a telecommunication service provider. Recently, it has been disputed whether such an action by the police requires a warrant by a judge. The legal issue is whether the placement of a GPS receiver without consent of the vehicle’s owner is “compulsory disposition” for which the police must comply with the procedure specified in the Criminal Procedure Law.

The decisions of the lower court are divided. In one case (Osaka District Court, 5 June 2015, unpublished), the court excluded the positioning track record obtained by the GPS receiver placed on the car without a warrant, by holding that the record was “evidence obtained through an unreasonable investigation.”

The same court, however, later held that the accused was found guilty by other evidence than the excluded track record (Osaka District Court, 10 July 2015, unpublished). Before that decision, another judge at the same court (Osaka District Court, 27 January 2015, unpublished) held that acquiring GPS information in a similar way is not unreasonable. The facts of the two cases are different, not least the precision level of the device used. Therefore, how the case law will develop is yet to be seen.

Developing Applications: Key to QZSS Success
The importance of developing applications for QZSS signals is so well recognized that it was written into the conditions of the PFI procurement for ground facilities, which required the contractor to explore potential application services.

The operator of the system (whether the government or QSS) is not expected to enter into an agreement with a potential application service provider. The operator will unilaterally send out signals from the satellites, and anyone can use them to develop applications. Technically, the application service provider must accept the performance standard and interface specifications for the QZSS signals. These documents are distributed only to the members of QZS System User Society (QSUS). The membership of QSUS is open to any individual free of charge.

With regards the civil liability that could arise in case of errors in signals, an issue sometimes discussed in Europe, no specific arguments have been made. A general understanding seems to be that the operator can be immune from such liability, if the performance standard and interface specifications include a disclaimer that mentions the need for incorporating redundancies, where necessary.

The apparent absence of concerns about liability may partly be due to the fact that QZSS has developed as a complement and augmentation to GPS. The signals, like GPS, are sent out without charge and this may give the impression that the user makes use of the signals at their “own risk” without liability to the system operator.

This commonly held belief may not be entirely correct, however, as levying a charge is only one of the factors that determine an operator liability and not a conclusive one. Further, unlike in the United States, sovereign immunity has been abandoned in Japan and the government can incur liability based on negligence under the State Compensation Act. These differences, however, have not attracted much attention yet.

Conclusions
Japan’s QZSS is similar to the European Galileo in that its use is limited to civil and commercial purposes, with no military use being intended. As such, not only the space-specific laws but also general laws such as the Civil Code, Radio Act and Telecommunication Services Act will be relevant.

Until now, only the privacy issues have been much debated, because they are common to GPS and, therefore, are already real problems. Other issues such as the contractual framework with application service providers or the tort liability for erroneous signals have not yet discussed. Still, they might gain larger importance once the system is in full operation.

Additional Resources
[1] Aoki, Setsuko (2009), Current Status and Recent Developments of Japan’s National Space Law and its Relevance to Pacific Rim Space Law and Activities, Journal of Space Law 35: 363
[2] Kitamura, Naohiro (2015), The Impact of Japan’s New Space Policy on Business, Space Law Newsletter of the International Bar Association Legal Practice Division, 2015: 3
[3] Kozuka, Souichirou (forthcoming), Law and Navigational Satellite Systems in Japan, in: Ram Jakhu (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Space Law, Routledge
[4] Murakami, Hiroshi (2008), New Legislation on NSDI in Japan: “Basic Act on the Advancement of Utilizing Geospatial Information”, Bulletin of the Geographical Survey Institute 55: 1
[5] Pekkanen, Saadia M., and Paul Kallender-Umezu (2010), In Defense of Japan: From the Market to the Military in Space Policy, Stanford University Press.
[6] Tsujino, Teruhisa (2005), Effectiveness of the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System in Ubiquitous Positioning, Science & Technology Trends – Quarterly Review (NISTEP) 16: 88.

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The term PNT is a synonym for navigation activities as defined in the Federal Law on Navigation Activities. The PNT system in the Russian Federation is defined as the combination of administrative and technical means that provide spatial and time data to all user groups, with GLONASS as a key element.

Figure 1 (see inset photo, above right, for all figures) shows a basic scheme of the Russian PNT system. It consists of four main elements:

• a set of common resources ensuring PNT (deployment and maintenance of navigation system and services, including GLONASS, PNT fundamental support, as well as relevant geo-information resources)
• a set of PNT user resources (consisting of user systems of public importance, including timing in energy or communications networks as well as systems used for aviation, meteorology, or geodesy)
• an information and telecommunications segment providing all necessary data links, including relevant exchange and transmission procedures
• a set of supervisory and regulatory resources, including safety and security assurance, public PNT management, monitoring and supervision, as well as the applicable legal and regulatory framework.

Major PNT Stakeholders in the Russian Federation
Figure 2 shows the major stakeholders involved in the Russian PNT system and their relationship over the PNT lifecycle: development, operations, usage, and evolution.

The stakeholders include the president, the government, several federal executive authorities (FEAs), PNT system designer and user equipment manufacturers, PNT-based applications and service providers, and the users.

The figure provides only a general overview of the governance structures. Full involvement of a certain stakeholder in a certain lifecycle aspect is shown by blue circles, light blue is used where the involvement is partial, and a cross is used in case of no involvement.

Legal and Regulatory Framework
The Russian PNT system is subject to a highly complex legal and regulatory framework consisting of more than 900 applicable documents on various levels. The overall framework can be divided into legal and regulatory elements.

The legal framework in Russia deals with subject-to-subject relationships and the regulatory framework, subject-to-object relationships. In simplified terms, “subject” means individuals or communities of any kind, and “object” means physical things such as technical equipment and systems. However, titles of laws or regulations do not always properly reflect this; so, there are legal acts with substantial regulatory (technical) elements, and vice versa.

Figure 3 provides a general overview on the legal (upper left) and regulatory (lower) framework.

The legal framework includes relevant international law, all levels of federal law (including residential and governmental decrees and directives, as well as FEA bylaws and acts of regional authorities, down to municipal ordinances.

The regulatory framework mainly deals with the GLONASS system and its functional parts. Various sets of acts define navigation satellites’ subsystems, operational control subsystems, differential subsystems, user equipment, navigation and information systems, geodetic and metrological support, and data provision.

Legal Framework
Figure 4 provides a more detailed scheme of the legal framework in the Russian Federation.

International legal instruments to which Russia is party are at the highest level. These can be divided into the more than 40 instruments that involve GLONASS directly and those involving it indirectly, such as World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements. The second is the federal level and includes laws and bylaws. Presidential and governmental decrees and directives, as well as FEA acts, belong to this category.

The third level encompasses acts on regional level, again including laws and bylaws. This level is mainly focused on road transport monitoring and infrastructure, especially for governmental users. Finally, there is the level of municipal bylaws.

Of course, a broad range of strategic or programmatic documents also exist, such as development programs, strategies, or concepts issued by various executive authorities. These do not form part of the legal and regulatory framework although they may strongly determine its further development. Frequently, they also contain so-called “rules and principles” of a regulatory nature. Around 80 such relevant strategic or planning documents deal with PNT. PNT-related legal and regulatory instruments exist on all of the previously described levels and include instruments of all types. In most cases — about 60 percent — these cover PNT along with other issues.

Those fully devoted to PNT exist mainly on the regional or municipal levels; less than 20 percent are found on the federal level. As GLONASS and other PNT systems and services are mainly used in the transport sector, the most active stakeholder is the Ministry of Transport, which has responsibility for around 9 percent of all relevant instruments.

The most important legal instruments affecting the use and operation of GLONASS or PNT in general include the following:

• Federal laws — Federal Law no. 5663-1 on Space Activities issued 13.07.2015, Federal Law no. 431 on geodesy and mapping issued 30.12.2015, Federal Law no. 22 on navigation activities issued 13.07.2015, Federal Law no. 395 on ERA-GLONASS system issued 13.07.2015, and Federal Law no. 102 on uniformity of measurements issued 13.07.2015.
• Presidential decrees and directives: President’s Decree no. 638 on Use of GLONASS for the Benefit of Social and Economic Development of the Russian Federation, issued 17.05.2007.
• Governmental decrees and Directives — Decree on GNSS usage in Transportation and Geodesy; FEA powers in GLONASS sustainment, development and usage; some aspects of ERA-GLONASS development and usage.
• FEA bylaws: Federal Radionavigation Plan; Ministry of Transportation Orders on Equipping Vehicles with GLONASS/GLONASS-GPS; Ministry of Transportation Orders on User Equipment Requirements (Ministry of transportation Orders no. 20, 23, 35, 195, 311, 319, 348, etc.).

Regulatory Framework
Figure 5 shows a more detailed scheme of the regulatory framework, which, as mentioned earlier, mainly deals with the GLONASS system.

A number of sets of acts define the GLONASS system, including terms and definitions; regulatory documents for GNSS special uses; agencies’ regulatory documents on special uses, and documents defining timing.

In addition, acts define the two main components of GLONASS: the Operational Control Subsystem (interface control documents or ICDs and technical requirements) and the Navigation Satellites Subsystem (ICD, performance standards and technical requirements).

Other elements of the Russian PNT system are also defined by sets of regulatory acts.

The first part concerns sets of acts generally relating to differential GLONASS subsystems. The five sets include terms and definitions, classification, general technical requirements, test methods and results, and regulatory documents on subsystem types. Further set of acts address the various types of differential subsystems: wide area, local, and regional.

The second part defines the user equipment and includes eight sets of acts. The third part has six sets on navigation and information system and the fourth part has six sets on geodesy. The fifth and last part concerns metrology with two sets of acts.

Generally, all the aforementioned sets of acts fully cover all needs of the various PNT users. However, two groups of problems have been identified in the legal and regulatory framework and are now being addressed by relevant stakeholders.

Collisions in the Legal and Regulatory Framework
Of these groups of problematic areas, one group exists on the national and the other on the international level.

National level issues include the following:

• Insufficient coordination within the legal and regulatory framework has resulted in some cases in collision or gaps. The larger number of instruments are bylaws, not federal laws. Sometimes, these have been adopted with insufficient recognition of the federal law, potentially leading to contradiction or uncertainties. As an example, some bylaws of the Ministry of Transportation (Ministry of Transportation Orders on User Equipment Requirements, and so on) conflict with the federal law “On technical regulation.”
• Because technical guidelines, which are most relevant to users and service providers, are based on bylaws, the aforementioned contradictions or uncertainties may flow down to the technical level.
• Insufficient links exist between the legal and regulatory acts concerning GLONASS and those concerning other aspects of the PNT system, such as geodesy, cartography and timing
• Lack of coordination in PNT legal and regulatory activities has arisen between the various levels of government, especially on the FEA level.
• FEA acts may not meet certain requirements of the federal law “On technical regulation.”

On the international level, the Russian Federation remains committed to provide for all international users free and non-discriminatory access to the GLONASS open signals, without intentional system degradation. The Russian Federal Space Agency acts as coordinator at this level and promotes international cooperation.

In order to support GLONASS use, federal authorities and organizations within their jurisdiction are mandated to use GLONASS- and GLONASS/GPS-based user equipment. For regional and local authorities, use of GLONASS- and GLONASS/GPS-based user equipment is recommended but not mandatory. Such measures promoting the use of the specified GNSS systems are not without criticism, especially with regard to market- access rules under the WTO agreements. The matter of market access is subject to exchanges within the International Committee on GNSS (ICG) Providers Forum.

Way Forward
These problematic issues on the national level can be addressed by a systematization and harmonization of existing acts, namely by overarching acts called “codes” in Russian legal practice.

One key element could be a future federal law currently entitled the “Navigation Code.” Such a code would cover all different PNT elements and activities.

Under the Russian legal system, a code is part of federal law. However, compared to other federal laws, a code is designed to have a long continuity, consolidated nature, considerable volume, and complicated structure Currently, the navigation code is widely discussed within the legal, administrative and scientific communities in the Russian Federation. If adopted, it would become the basis for a more harmonized legal and regulatory framework in the Russian Federation.

In addition, a roadmap for the further development of the PNT legal and regulatory framework is currently under preparation. It will include three main documents:

• PNT development strategy
• Legal and regulatory framework development strategy
• National and international regulations and standards development strategy.

These documents are mainly aiming to support the development and adoption procedures for the Navigation Code.

Conclusion
This article provides only a brief overview of legal and regulatory framework for PNT in the Russian Federation. The framework is highly complex. However, despite some problematic areas, it is sufficiently elaborated to allow PNT user groups to function efficiently. The framework is now developing quickly and we can expect that the problems we have discussed will be solved in the near future. A key element in this respect will be the (“potential” or “future”) navigation code currently under discussion.

Additional Resources

Bolkunov, A., “GLONASS and GNSS Performance Standards: Status and Plans,” Tenth Meeting of the International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems. Working Group A: Systems, Signals and Services. Boulder, Colorado, United States, November 3–5, 2015, pp. 1-11

Bolkunov, A., “GLONASS/PNT Sustainment and Development Legal and Regulatory Framework: Status and Plans,” Munich Satellite Navigation Summit 2015: Session 5. Legal Issues of GNSS Market Development. Munich, Germany, March 24–26, 2015, pp. 1–9

International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems: The Way Forward. United Nations, Office for Outer Space Affairs, 2016

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