Safran Electronics and Defense (France) is leading the ACHILE consortium (‘Augmented capability for high-end soldiers’), aimed at designing advanced soldier systems with enhanced capability suites. In June, 2023, the European Commission awarded ACHILE a €40-million grant, making it one of the main projects funded under the European Defense Fund 2021.

Providing close support to Safran are Rheinmetall Electronics (Germany), Indra Sistemas (Spain), and Leonardo (Italy). Over the next four years, the consortium will study and deliver operational concepts and new user and system requirements, to be harmonized at European level. The group will develop a so-called generic open soldier system reference architecture (GOSSRA) for Europe’s Preparatory Action Plan on Defense Research (PADR).

Along with innovative navigation units, new enhanced capability suites will include head-up displays for augmented reality, weapon sights, and exoskeletons. All will be evaluated via technological demonstrators and proofs of concept. Interchangeable capabilities are intended to improve all areas of dismounted combat, i.e. survivability, sustainability, mobility, localization and navigation, perception and situational awareness, lethality, smart engagement and communication.

Full slate of deliverables
ACHILE will develop new systems in four main areas: soldier-core and soldier-extension to address capabilities at soldier level, and team-core and team-extension to address squad and networking capabilities, as well as robotics and weapon interaction at team level. Specific aims include:

• Better protection for soldiers, with lighter equipment and improved ergonomics; a modular approach and optimized size, weight and power (SWAP) capability up to the system level.
• Enhanced soldier performance, in particular in terms of visual and sound perception, and individual situational awareness.
• Augmented team capabilities, through network connectivity, shared situational awareness, and coordination with all other units on the battlefield.

Newly designed networking capabilities will be evaluated in large-scale demonstrations with battlefield management systems (BMS) and communication systems. The project will also evaluate full-size prototypes in large-scale demonstrations under a variety of realistic conditions.

ACHILE gathers 30 partner participants from nine EU countries and Norway, including a wide range of small and medium-size enterprises, mid-caps, research institutes, universities, and large groups, encompassing the full soldier system value chain.

The post ACHILE Dismounted Soldier System to Include Innovative Navigation Units appeared first on Inside GNSS - Global Navigation Satellite Systems Engineering, Policy, and Design.

IRVINE, Calif.—Pasternack, an Infinite Electronics brand and a leading provider of RF, microwave and millimeter-wave products, recently introduced an innovative series of mil-spec GPS/GNSS antennas for use in various small form factor and mobile applications.

Pasternack’s new mil-spec GPS/GNSS antennas are engineered for environmental performance according to the MIL-STD-810G standard and include multi-standard GPS L1, Galileo E1 and GLONASS options.

These MIL-STD-810G GPS/GNSS antennas are IP67 rated. They are available in passive and active versions and provide coverage from 1597 MHz to 1607 MHz. Additionally, these GPS/GNSS antennas feature linear polarization for better cross-polarized isolation, nominal gain options of -3 dBic and 10 dBic, and SMA mounts.

“Our new mil-spec active GNSS antenna units are ideally suited for use in rugged terrain where low-profile, low-drag,bullet-style antennas are required,” said Kevin Hietpas, product line manager.

The post Pasternack Releases New Mil-Spec GPS/GNSS Antennas appeared first on Inside GNSS - Global Navigation Satellite Systems Engineering, Policy, and Design.

Ansys says the latest version of its Orbit Determination Tool Kit (ODTK), which provides highly accurate spacecraft orbit estimates, is better suited to operating near the moon and in “cislunar space,” the region between the Earth and the moon where orbiting spacecraft are influenced by the gravity of both bodies.

“Spacecraft in that area behave quite differently,” Ansys Distinguished Engineer James Woodburn said in a Feb. 21 webinar. “…We have both the Earth and the moon gravity acting on things, and really, there’s no general solutions that exist” for estimating orbits.

Cislunar space is defined as space on the Earth side of the moon, or space above the altitudes used primarily for Earth-focused missions, such as by geosynchronous equatorial orbit (GEO) satellites.

Woodburn said traditional missions in cislunar space have relied heavily on tracking from Earth-based ground stations, but interest in other options is growing.

“Typically, missions in cislunar space have relied on Earth-based ground tracking for their navigation needs. However, there is a large increase in interest in going to lunar and cislunar space these days, and we have a limited number of ground stations that are capable of supporting those missions,” he said. “So, there’s a lot of interest in finding other ways to track these missions, including using our existing GNSS systems…using lunar-based ground stations, [and] optical navigation is something that’s of interest.

“People are basically looking for ways to track missions that either reduce or eliminate the involvement of [Earth] ground-based assets,” he said.

Version 7.6 of the ODTK includes the ability to perform Earth-based GNSS observations in cislunar or lunar space; supports moon-based GNSS systems; and extends measurement models to multi-body [Earth and moon] scenarios, he said.

“That’s really where the focus of the upgrades of version 7.6 of ODTK are. It’s looking out into the future, what are people looking at in terms of trade studies, what are the pieces of future lunar architectures that we need to support, and so forth?”

The upgrades build on previous attributes, “such as the ability to have lunar ground stations track lunar orbiters from the surface of the moon, to be able to estimate landers and their location after they’ve landed, and we even added a preliminary rover location estimation capability,” he said.

Previous versions of ODTK have seen operational use in lunar and cislunar space on a variety of missions, including IBEX, the Interstellar Boundary Explorer, a small satellite studying the solar system boundary layer from an Earth orbit; LADEE, the Lunar Atmosphere and dust Environment Explorer, which orbits the moon; Beresheet, Israel’s ill-fated lunar lander; and the Korean Pathfinder Lunar Orbiter, which is flying using ODTK now; and several others.

Another mission was the groundbreaking James Webb Space Telescope, which sits at the Lagrange 2 point in space. That isn’t cislunar space but has similar behavior, Woodburn said.

The post Ansys’ Updated ODTK Software Prepared for More Lunar Missions appeared first on Inside GNSS - Global Navigation Satellite Systems Engineering, Policy, and Design.

A look at a multiscale interference monitoring approach using several different detectors, as well as an overview of findings of an interference monitoring campaign conducted at a European airport.

by Sascha Bartl, Manuel Kadletz, Philipp Berglez, Tomáš Duša

Global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) have become increasingly important in many different fields of application, including the aeronautical domain. With the growing dependency on GNSS for various safety-critical applications, both the threat of intentional signal disturbances and the number of reported incidents of jamming are increasing. Even spoofing attacks, which were long thought of as a theoretical threat requiring high effort and knowledge, can today be conducted using relatively cheap software-defined radios (SDRs) and open-source software.

Aeronautics depends on GNSS in several ways, including in-flight navigation, ground-based augmentation systems (GBAS) and surveillance. Recent publications have shown vulnerabilities of GNSS systems against jamming and spoofing and demonstrated that receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM), which is widely used in aviation, provides limited defense against intentional interference [1,2]. Therefore, there’s a need for the development, evaluation and use of dedicated interference monitoring algorithms, targeting jamming and spoofing, that are applicable to the most vulnerable phases of flight (i.e. approach and landing).

While on-board interference detection and mitigation is considered important for the long-term evolution of GNSS in aviation, both commercial and general, the approach presented here uses a ground-based monitoring station to detect interference and issue a warning to the users. When deployed in the vicinity of an airport, such a system can secure GNSS during approach and landing, which is critical. The ground-based design can be mounted at a fixed location, can be more power consuming and is less restricted by long-term certification requirements for aviation equipment.

Background

GNSS signals are susceptible to intentional interference without requiring very high signal power or overly complex equipment. This has been widely reported in literature, gaining public interest in 2001 with the Volpe report [3], which assessed the dependencies of the transportation infrastructure on GPS and the vulnerabilities to signal interference. The two main factors contributing to the vulnerability of GNSS signals against interference are the low received signal power (below thermal noise) and the open and publicly known signal structure. Although modernized signals counter the vulnerabilities by employing more sophisticated modulation schemes like higher-order binary offset carrier (BOC) or authentication features, these countermeasures cannot provide perfect interference mitigation. Many systems also still rely on older signals.

Signal Model

To counter the threat of intentional interference, it is important to understand GNSS signal structure. Therefore, a basic signal model used throughout the development of the detection algorithms is presented here. The equations are derived from [4].

According to [4], a radio frequency (RF) signal xRF(t) can be written

as a function of time t at a certain carrier frequency fc, with the in-phase I and quadrature-phase Q components xI (t) and xQ(t). These two components are orthogonal to each other and share the same power normalization factor of √ 2. The 90° phase delay of the quadrature component leads to the signals being right-handed circularly polarized (RHCP).

GNSS uses both the I and Q components of the baseband signal to transmit more than one navigational signal on the same carrier wave, which is generally known as quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK). In this modulation scheme, each component is spread across a certain bandwidth by using binary phase shift keying (BPSK) or BOC modulation. For actual transmission of information to the receiver, a navigation message D(t)  [1; 1] (at signal level) is introduced in addition, leading to a single signal component y(t) reading

where P(t) denotes the power of the signal component, A(t) is the amplitude and C(t) is the binary spreading sequence or pseudorandom noise (PRN) code. Inserting (2) into (1) yields

as generic model of a typical GNSS signal as transmitted by a satellite. The received signal of a single satellite on Earth can be expressed as

where (t) denotes the code delay, 0 is the phase delay and fD(t) denotes the Doppler frequency shift due to the relative motion between satellite and receiver. The overall signal received contains the signals of all satellites in view as well as thermal noise and can thus be expressed (using the trigonometric identity as shown in [4]) as

with si being the signal from satellite i attenuated by ai(t), N denoting the number of satellites in view and n(t) being additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN).

Intentional Interference

GNSS interference can be unintentional (e.g., inter-system interference, multipath, etc.) or intentional. Unintentional interference generally can be better controlled and mitigated [5–7] and is not the primary focus of this work. Intentional interference is categorized into the two main categories, jamming and spoofing, which pose a significant risk to GNSS measurements. Jamming denotes the transmission of high-powered signals with the goal to shadow the GNSS signals so a receiver cannot acquire and track them. Typical jamming signals are chirp or noise signals with a bandwidth matching or exceeding the bandwidth of the respective GNSS bands they target.

A good overview of available civil jamming devices and their signal characteristics is presented in [8]. The signal model presented in (5) in case of jamming is extended as

with sj(t) denoting the jamming signal. As mentioned, the actual waveform of this jamming signal is not primarily important. Any interference signal leads to a decrease in carrier-to-noise ratio (C/N0) of the received satellite signals, which, if the decrease is high enough, leads to the inability of acquisition and tracking.

Spoofing denotes the transmission of fake GNSS signals with the goal to falsify (spoof) the position, velocity and time (PVT) solution of the receiver under attack. For this, spoofing signals have to be modulated in the same way authentic satellites are modulated. The navigation messages also usually have to be mimicked for a spoofing attack to work well. Typical spoofing attacks rely on either a GNSS signal generator or a modified (usually software-defined) GNSS receiver [9]. The signal model in case of spoofing is extended to

where the superscript S denotes a spoofing signal. The spoofing signals’ code delay  as received not only depends on the actual and spoofed position but also on the spoofer’s synchronization error. This contains the error in time synchronization relative to the GNSS time as well as the error in the estimation of the victim receivers’ position, which is crucial for successful spoofing attacks.

GNSS Interference in Aeronautics

Interference has multiple potential impacts on aircraft systems. The most common impact is the complete loss of GNSS reception, which results in loss of position, navigation and time (PNT). However, given the variety of systems operating, the impacts will not be homogenous across all fleets and equipage. In some cases, the GNSS signal could be degraded but not completely lost, resulting in decreased position accuracy.

The aircraft receiver is the main source of position information, which drives the aircraft navigation system supporting required navigation performance (RNP) operations and providing position input to different aircraft systems. Some business aircraft even use GNSS as a reference source for aircraft flight control and stability systems [10]. GNSS interference, either intentional or unintentional, introduces a threat to the navigation equipment via different vectors. A wide variety of aircraft and ground systems rely on proper GNSS service and thus have to be assessed in terms of the effects of a malfunctioning service affecting different flight phases. Figure 1 gives a holistic overview of the impacts of a jamming/spoofing attack.

Development of a Multiscale Interference Monitoring Algorithm

The effect of interference on a GNSS receiver can be recognized within various stages of the signal processing as indicated in Figure 1. Therefore, it is considered vital for reliable interference monitoring to also target all of these stages by combining different detectors within a multiscale approach. This ensures high reliability in terms of high detection probability and low false-alarm rates. During the development, special attention was also paid to the regulatory framework within aviation.

The Regulatory Framework

The FAA’s technical standard orders (TSOs) are used as a basis for qualifying aviation equipment. They are typically short documents that mostly rely on minimum operational performance standards (MOPS) as provided by the radio technical commission for aeronautics (RTCA), but in some cases deviate from those RTCA standards by adding, removing or changing the requirements.

A TSO-authorized part qualifies as an airworthy component. As such, a TSO is a minimum performance standard. When authorized to manufacture a receiver to a TSO standard, this is referred to as a TSO authorization. Current GNSS receivers are approved against one of the following TSOs:

• TSO-C129 (GPS as a supplemental means, last version found in RTCA DO208 [11])
• TSO-C145 (GPS+SBAS sensor feeding an FMS, last version found in RTCA DO229F [12])
• TSO-C146 (standalone GPS+SBAS, last version found in RTCA DO229F [12])
• TSO-C196 (GPS sensor feeding into an FMS, replacement of TSO-C129, last version found in RTCA DO316 [13])
• TSO-C161 (GPS+GBAS, last version found in RTCA DO253C [14])

Jamming Detection

Detecting GNSS jamming has been widely covered in literature [15–18]. In general, jamming detection can be performed pre-correlation or post-correlation, while the most suitable approach depends on the type and possibilities of the receiver in use. Because different detectors have different advantages and disadvantages, as pointed out, [15], an optimal jamming detector should be based on the combination of several detector values.

The approach presented in this article relies on monitoring the power spectral density (PSD), total received power within the band and C/N0 of the tracked satellites. The combination of pre-correlation and post-correlation measures is considered advantageous for a low false-alarm rate, which is important for aviation. Furthermore, the chosen detectors are considered to be certifiable for aeronautics with a reasonable effort.

The Jamming Detectors:

PSD Detector

The PSD detector is based on the recorded raw intermediate frequency (IF) signal without further preprocessing within the receiver. Transformation into the frequency domain is performed using Fourier transform as in

while the PSD can generally be computed as

with fS denoting sampling frequency and a sample size N. In the presented approach, the PSD is computed using Welch’s method [19], which is considered optimal because of the smoothing effect. To accurately receive absolute power levels in the PSD, the actual gain of the RF components has to be known/calibrated. For jamming detection, the received PSD can be compared to the expected shape, which is mainly determined by the filter in the radio-frequency front-end (RFFE). The expected power spectrum can easily be estimated as thermal noise combined with the aforementioned filter, because the authentic GNSS signals are actually received below the noise floor.

For the detector presented here, two sets of thresholds above the expected spectrum are defined as follows:

NARROWBAND THRESHOLD: Single peaks within the received PSD are compared to a defined frequency-dependent threshold mask, which can be tailored to the respective filter characteristics or to exclude known tolerated interference signals based on their frequency. The narrowband threshold is considered optimal for detection of narrowband or continuous wave (CW) interference.

WIDEBAND THRESHOLD: The received PSD is averaged over defined frequency bins to form multiple sub-band power levels, which in turn are compared to a dedicated frequency-dependent threshold mask. The wideband threshold is considered optimal for detecting wideband interference. The wideband threshold can be set much lower compared to the narrowband without compromising on false alarm rate because the averaging provides an additional level of smoothing.

For use in aeronautics, these thresholds might be set to the values defined by ICAO as shown in Figure 2.

Received Power Detector

The received power detector measures the absolute received signal power within the monitored frequency band. This is done by computing the power within the digitized signal s[n] and subtracting the actual RF gain (t) as

with N being the number of samples for averaging. Because the GNSS frequency bands are protected, the expected total received power within the band can simply be assumed the thermal noise floor given as

with the Boltzmann constant kB, temperature T0 and bandwidth B. The detector is a simple threshold comparison, which indicates jamming in case the measured power exceeds the expected power plus the defined threshold.

The C/N0 Detector

The effective C/N0 can be used for interference monitoring as post-correlation jamming detector by comparing the actually measured CN0 with an expected value. In general, the effective C/N0 can be written

the carrier power C, processing loss in the desired signal LS, noise level N0, processing loss in the noise LN and the total level of interference Itotal. The total interference level can be written

Neglecting the effect of external interference Iextern (which can be seen the same way as jamming signals for the sake of the detector), it can be seen the effect of inter- and intra-system interference should be considered to calculate the expected C/ N0. Inter- and intra-system interference is caused by other GNSS signals (from the same or other constellations) in the same band and can be characterized

for M signals present at the same time, where Ck denotes the signal power, Lk is the implementation loss for the interference signal and k is the spectral separation coefficient (SSC). The SSC describes the level of interference caused by a certain signal/modulation and can be computed based on the frequency spectra of the respective signals [7].

Jamming detection based on the C/N0 is performed threshold-based per satellite, where the difference between each measured and expected C/N0 is computed as

and compared to a pre-defined threshold. This is done for each tracked signal, which leads to a certain percentage of signals indicating jamming. In case this percentage exceeds a defined threshold, a jamming detection is triggered. The approach to summarize the results of all satellites allows for a reasonably low false-alarm rate because an eventual degradation of the C/ N0 for a subset of signals (as for example caused by multipath of partial shadowing) is also expected in cases without jamming.

Combination and Weighting

The three jamming detectors are combined to one final jamming detection decision, which is outlined in Figure 3. The detectors have different weightings, which is a result of an empirical optimization performed using simulations. The final score is either that no jamming can be detected, a warning or an alarm, which can easily be visualized to a user within an operational aviation scenario.

Figure 3 shows the PSD detector has the highest weight followed by the C/N0 and the received power mainly serves as supplementary measure. At least two detectors have to be triggered to issue an alarm. A warning is either triggered by the PSD, C/N0 detector or the combined detection of received power and a second detector. This makes sense because the three detectors are complementary in terms of which signal types (or bandwidths) they can optimally detect. The inclusion (and high weighting) of the C/N0 detector also makes sense as it allows for detection of smart jamming/spectrum-matched jamming signals, which might be undetected by pre-correlation detectors.

Spoofing Detection

Detecting GNSS spoofing is more complex than jamming detection given the different nature of the attack, where a fine-tuned spoofing cannot necessarily be seen in the frequency spectrum. Nevertheless, several spoofing detection algorithms have been published in literature [21–24]. While some spoofing detection algorithms target multiple antennas or are only applicable with relative movement between spoofer and receiver, the approach presented here is suitable for a static single-antenna receiver, which is considered to facilitate eventual certification procedures due to the lower complexity of the overall system.

The Spoofing Detectors:

C/N0 Detector

Spoofing detection based on C/N0 follows the same basic principles as in the jamming explanation. The only difference is the detection metric is inverse compared to the jamming detection as

This is because the expected C/N0 in case of a spoofing attack is higher than authentic, which is required for a successful takeover of the spoofing signal. For details on generation and prerequisites of spoofing attacks, read [25].

Correlation Peak Detector

From the spoofed signal model presented in (7) directly follows that the spoofing signals usually cannot remove the authentic GNSS signals from the received signal. Instead, the spoofing signals are added to the overall signal with a (slightly) higher power level. Because of this, the correlation function in case of a spoofing attack shows two correlation peaks instead of one, as is visualized in Figure 4.

The correlation peak detection method is twofold. It monitors for the existence of multiple correlation peaks within the complete code-Doppler search space and for distorted correlation peaks, which is the case when the authentic and spoofing signals partially overlap with each other. Multiple correlation peaks are easily found using a parallel code search FFT-based acquisition algorithm [26] while deliberately removing any already tracked correlation peaks. Monitoring for distorted correlation peaks is done using signal quality monitoring (SQM) metrics in code-delay domain as introduced in [27]. Note the detection of distorted correlation peaks is also common for multipath detection.

Clock Detector

The clock-based spoofing detector operates on the assumption of non-perfect synchronization of the spoofed signals with respect to their authentic counterparts. A GNSS receiver continually estimates its own clock bias relative to the system time within the PVT solution. After receiver initialization, large jumps in the estimated clock bias are typically not expected due to the clock steering algorithm. In case of spoofing takeover, however, such a jump is expected (it is the combined effect of non-perfect time synchronization of the spoofer and nonperfect spoofer as well as victim receiver position estimation).

In an authentic case, the clock bias changes are mainly driven by the clock drift, which is a direct effect of the nonperfect frequency stability of the oscillator. Spoofing signals, however, are also generated using an oscillator as frequency standard, which might show a different clock drift. This results in a change of the observed clock drift after the start of a spoofing attack.

For spoofing detection, the clock bias r(t) and clock drift r(t) at time t are both monitored by predicting the expected values for the next epoch (t + t) as

with an estimated variance model of

following traditional variance propagation. For the detection, the measured bias and drift are compared with the expected values based on a standard student-t hypothesis test for the mean value, where the mean value is not a priori known.

Note the clock-based detector can only show the beginning of a spoofing attack where the takeover happens. After takeover, the observed clock bias and drift will show the combined clock effect for spoofer and receiver but will again be consistent over time.

Combination and Weighting

The combination of the three spoofing detectors is visualized in Figure 5. After the first stage of detection using the dedicated spoofing detectors, the jamming detectors based on PSD and received power are re-used as secondary spoofing detectors. In case these detectors show a detected jamming event, this is added to the spoofing detection score if at least one of the spoofing detectors was triggered before. Finally, the overall detection score is compared to thresholds again to distinguish between warning or alarm.

The three detectors are equally weighted for the first stage of detection because they are considered partially complementary to each other. In the case of a high-powered spoofing attack, the difference in signal level between spoofed and authentic signals is also high, which means the difference in C/N0 can be considered significant, while on the other hand the authentic correlation peaks might be drowned in the noise floor due to automatic gain control (AGC) and limited dynamic range. Vice versa, during a well-synchronized and rather low-powered spoofing attack, the effect on the C/N0 might not be significant at all, but multiple peaks or distortions of correlation are better detectable because the power levels of both peaks are comparable. The clock detector can only detect the moment of takeover but works independent of the spoofing power levels (which is especially important for sophisticated spoofing attacks where artificial noise floor is transmitted together with the spoofing signals).

The secondary detection stage is used only after at least one first stage detector was triggered and can increase the detection score. This is justified by the fact spoofing signals are usually more powerful than authentic ones and thus increase the received spectrum and power level.

Monitoring Campaign

The authors had the unique opportunity to install an interference monitoring system for a three-month permanent monitoring campaign in direct vicinity of the airport Brno in Czech Republic. Some findings from this monitoring campaign are presented here.

Installation

The installation of the monitoring system took place in November 2020 at the location in Figure 6. The monitoring station is near the airport Brno (LKTB) and close to a major highway (D1). The minimum distance between highway and monitoring station is 480m, which is considered small enough for successful detection of most commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) jammers on the highway and is also representative for the airport.

Installation was performed at an airport building, where the antenna could be mounted on a mast and the monitoring system was connected to it via RF cable and could be placed within a 19″ server rack. Figure 7 shows the installation on-site as well as the user interface of the monitoring system, which can be accessed remotely for monitoring purposes. Furthermore, the site has a direct fiber network connection to the airport’s tower building, which was used for data transfer.

Overview of Monitoring Results

The interference monitoring campaign was conducted September 24 to December 20, 2020, resulting in 88 days of signal monitoring. Table 1 provides an overview of the detected interference events. As indicated in the table, the average number of detected events per day was 14.5, which is in line with the authors’ expectations based on literature and monitoring system placement. The two spoofing detections were classified as false alarms and could not be verified using the recorded data (the most likely reason for this is the placement of the antenna beside a mast, which might lead to significant multipath for certain satellites).

Given the placement of the monitoring system relative to the highway, it is no surprise the majority of interference events were detected for a duration of roughly 6 seconds. We can assume the detection duration and number of detected events would be higher if placed directly beside the highway because the highway is considered the major source of interference at the installation location. Also the proportion of alarms compared to warnings would have been much higher because the effect of interference signals significantly decreases with increasing distance.

Event Examples

The following are examples of recorded interference events to show the visible effect of interference on the monitoring system.

EVENT NO. 30: This event is an example of a wideband interference signal spread across the complete monitored spectrum in the L1/E1 frequency band (Figure 8). The interference signal is clearly visible in the recorded spectrum and above the detection threshold. It also shows a recognizable degradation of C/N0 for all satellites.

Event Parameters:

START TIME: 2020-09-24 05:31:13 (UTC), duration: 8 seconds

SEVERITY: alarm, classified type: SCW

EVENT NO. 4015: This event also shows a wideband interference signal across the complete bandwidth, but with fewer spikes compared to event No. 30 (Figure 9). The effect of interference on the GNSS is higher based on the C/N0 and the fact there are actual tracking (and consequently PVT) losses during the event.

Event Parameters:

START TIME: 2020-10-21 19:24:20 (UTC), duration: 43 seconds

SEVERITY: alarm, classified type: SCW

EVENT NO. 4031: This event shows a very interesting narrowband/CW interference signal, located directly on the L1/E1 carrier (Figure 10). Based on the authors’ previous analyses of COTS jammers and their respective signal properties, this interference event is not assumed to be caused by a COTS jammer. Still, the effect of the interference is clearly visible as C/N0 degradation and thus the detection is justified.

Event Parameters:

START TIME: 2020-10-22 09:34:19 (UTC), duration: 59 seconds

SEVERITY: warning, classified type: CW/ unknown

Wide-Area Interference Event

Beside the expected local interference events, the monitoring campaign also showed an interesting series of events on December 10. They were detected not only in Brno but also simultaneously using a different detector (different type and manufacturer) in Prague with a matching spectrum. Thus, the interference had been spread over a significantly wider area, which leads to the assumption it might have been space-based.

Event Parameters:

START TIME: 2020-12-10 07:45:06 (UTC), duration: 6 seconds (multiple times on this day)

SEVERITY: alarm

Figure 11 shows a short time Fourier transform (STFT) computed from the recorded signal snapshots during the event (before the start and during the event). The interference signal is rather narrowband within L1/E1. Further analysis of this specific event is considered of importance and interest, especially because there has been no notification on malfunctions by GNSS providers for this day.

Conclusions and Outlook

This article reviewed the signal model for GNSS signals and intentional interference by means of jamming and spoofing. It presented a multiscale interference monitoring approach based on the combination of several different detectors. Findings of an interference monitoring campaign at the airport Brno also have been presented.

The number and severity of detected interference events clearly shows intentional interference by means of jamming is a major concern for aviation and other relevant applications. The authors see this as a clear indication for the necessity of permanently installed monitoring systems to secure safety critical applications relying on GNSS.

More research is needed regarding the interference event on December 10. We plan to conduct a second monitoring campaign where the monitoring system will be installed directly at a highway to see the increase of detections and severity. The developed monitoring approach will be extended toward non-stationary monitoring receivers and refined in accordance to aviation certification requirements.

Acknowledgment

The presented developments and monitoring campaign have been conducted in the course of two research projects ˝GNSS Interference Detection & Analysis System (GIDAS)˝ and ˝GNSS Vulnerability and Mitigation in the Czech Republic˝ funded by the European Space Agency (ESA) within the NAVISP program.

This article is based on material presented in a technical paper at ION GNSS+ 2021, available at ion.org/publications/ order-publications.cfm.

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Authors

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Speakers at the 14th European Space Conference in Brussels discussed the need to defend EU assets against unfriendly attacks. Recent events in Eastern Europe would seem to lend force to such concerns, as the European Union makes headway toward the intersection of civil infrastructure and security and defense.

At the 14th European Space Conference earlier this year, EU Internal Market Commissioner Thierry Breton said, “Space is a contested domain. We should develop new infrastructures as dual-use by design, integrating the defense needs from the outset.”

Among Europe’s key space assets are the Galileo satellite-based navigation system and the EGNOS augmentation system, both of which are due for upgrades in the coming years. Galileo second generation (G2G) will feature improvements in the form of increased, designed-in robustness for both civilian and military users.

“Following my decision to accelerate the deployment of the second generation,” Breton said, “we have now prepared all the necessary contractual conditions and we are expecting to receive the first second-generation satellite in 2024, for a launch in 2024.” 

Meanwhile, the next generation of EGNOS will provide dual-frequency, multi-constellation (DFMC) services, augmenting GPS L1/L5 and Galileo E1/E5.

It doesn’t require a lot of imagination to appreciate the military value of secure, highly accurate and robust space-based positioning and navigation. A European Commission source told Inside GNSS: “Secured navigation and timing is essential for most military operations, as illustrated by the current widespread use of GPS PPS [Precise Positioning Service].” 

PPS is the highly accurate military positioning, navigation and timing service reserved for authorized users, broadcast on GPS L1 and L2 frequencies. Both frequencies contain a precision (P/Y) code ranging signal with an encrypted navigation data message.

“Similar applications can be envisaged based on the Galileo Public Regulated Service [PRS],” our source said. “The Galileo PRS offers a navigation service restricted to government-authorized users for sensitive applications. These are applications requiring a high level of service continuity, using strong, encrypted signals notably in the area of security and defense. The PRS, like GPS PPS, is designed to offer unlimited and uninterrupted service worldwide. Significantly higher radio frequency power levels are also an important element in this context.”

Changing Times 

Galileo was conceived and long presented as a purely civil system, for civilian use and under civilian control.

“This does not mean it cannot address the needs of all kinds of user communities,” our Commission source said. “There are already very established processes to collect the needs of governmental users in Member States and the specification, design and deployment options selected for Galileo are inherently consistent with the provision of service of a dual-use nature. This covers the service and performance specifications, the security engineering put in place throughout the design, the location of critical infrastructure, the redundancy of the design, etc.” Galileo’s elder rival, GPS, for its part, was proudly designed and developed and continues to be operated as a military infrastructure, which just happens to have been made available to civilian users.

So, GPS, Galileo and similar space systems represent a powerful yet vulnerable infrastructure, on which, increasingly, today’s worldwide economy relies. With the EU having publicly recognized the value of Galileo as a defense asset and knowing how crucial it is to keeping the wheels of business turning, the need to defend it, with urgency, is also clear.

The Russian Question

“All bilateral contacts with Russia in respect of space have been frozen since the annexation of the Crimea in 2014,” our European Commission source said. “Since then, there has been no dialogue with Russia and the limited contacts with representatives from the Russian authorities have been made in the course of meetings at the international level.”

In space, real physical action took the place of civil dialogue quite emphatically last November, when the Russian Federation shot down an orbiting satellite with a surface-to-space missile. The vulnerability of the world’s space-based assets was thus made plain. A statement from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) at the time said it had targeted one of its own inactive satellites as a demonstration. This was in response to the United States’ new space strategy, with one of the goals being, Russia’s MoD said, to create a comprehensive military advantage in space.

In April, the U.S. became the first country to announce a ban on missile tests against space satellites. U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris, who chairs the National Space Council, said tests like the one carried out by Russia were reckless, although it should be pointed out that the U.S., along with China and India, have all carried out similar tests. The American administration first showed interest in such a ban last December.

The EU had already expressed concern over the threat posed by space debris, the increasing multitude of derelict and potentially dangerous space junk floating around in orbit. It’s clear that, from now on, not everything endangering space assets is necessarily up there by mistake. Europe, along with the rest of the world, has to be prepared to face a deliberate attack on space infrastructure, including critical communication, earth observation and navigation satellites.

“The Union, of course, already has surveillance and tracking systems,” Breton said at the Space Conference in Brussels. “We monitor more than 240 satellites in real time, including Galileo and Copernicus [Copernicus is the EU’s earth observation system], in order to protect them against risks and collisions, but faced with the challenges of the multiplication of threats we must go further and define a holistic system approach.”

“The security threats on Galileo are similar to those for most critical infrastructure,” our Commission source said. “Cyber threats are obviously high on the list. There are also emerging threats, with the ever-growing pressure and threat environment on space assets as recently illustrated in the news. The threat environment being volatile by definition, the European space program adapts regularly its approach to mitigate them to an acceptable level.”

In a response to Russia’s more recent actions on the ground, the European Agency for the Space Program (EUSPA) has launched a platform to put space at the service of the Ukrainian people. 

Our Commission source said, “We are trying to use space assets to help Ukrainians. This platform aims to match innovators, startups and companies with NGOs and other helpers. It gathers applications and solutions that leverage freely accessible data from Galileo and Copernicus, to enhance humanitarian support for the Ukrainian people and invites the innovation community to propose additional ones. The applications and solutions published on this platform will cover a wide range of uses, from supporting NGOs delivering medical goods via drones, to practical solutions to support the integration in EU countries of people fleeing the war.”

A Diversity of Partners

European space isn’t only about the public sector. Representing industry, Philippe Clar, Ariane Group executive vice president, defence programmes, said, “Knowing what’s going on above is key to all military operations. That is why we have deployed a network of sensors called GEOtracker.” 

The system, comprising optical sensors, a control center and distributed around the globe, provides extremely precise positioning and orbit-tracking data for objects in medium Earth orbit (MEO) and geostationary Earth orbit (GEO). “We have been providing this service to the French Space Command,” Clar said. “We have added laser technologies and we will reach up to 30 telescopes by 2025. What is interesting to notice is that 10% of the objects we track are not in the public domain. That is, they are not known.”

Also representing industry, Antoine Noguier, executive vice president, strategy, Airbus Defense and Space, talked about the capacities needed to bolster European security and defense: “We are entering into a dependence on space, and that dependence creates vulnerability. The threat element is increasing, with the chief threat coming from the Earth. The Russian satellite missile shot was actually striking in this regard. Kinetic threats are important, because space assets are not protected. But we also see other developing threats, those being non-kinetic—jamming, cyber—all that is coming, very hard to detect, and detection is the first element you need to consider. We need connectivity, high-enough broadband to establish communications superiority, which is what you need today on the battlefield.”

Commissioner Breton also highlighted the importance of secure connectivity: “We want to avoid potential strategic dependencies [on American and other non-EU assets] to establish ultra-secure, space-based connectivity infrastructure, using quantum encryption, a government and commercial communication service, integrating from the start the military usage. The secure connectivity infrastructure could be equipped with a payload on the LEO [low Earth orbit] satellites, allowing to monitor space from space. We could better organize joint situational awareness, with the participation of all actors.”

Nougier continued: “Our position, navigation and timing is already in place, but that needs to be further developed in order to achieve resilience by combining the capabilities of different dedicated space assets, including using commercial assets. The duality of space is important, and that’s also what we do at Airbus, using all capabilities between orbits LEO, GEO to secure data. We need to be able to detect who is doing what in orbit. The Americans have launched two satellites dedicated for this purpose, targeting a total of six. This means we need to have dedicated assets like this to achieve our ambition.”

And again, Breton: “Our aim could be in the long run to establish, let’s say, a true European Space Command. For now, we are looking forward to this year when we go from words to concrete implementation, when we will finally, concretely and fully, integrate the defense and strategic dimension of space.”

EUSPA Remains Central Player

Breton described a new governance arrangement for secure space connectivity based on the Galileo governance model. Indeed, there is already a proposed EU regulation to establish such a framework for space connectivity infrastructure. The regulation would extend the Galileo security governance model to other space components. This entails the operation of a common infrastructure under civilian control, meeting defense and security needs via a secured service for government users. Once adopted, our Commission source said, the new regulation will enable enhanced EU connectivity with military-level resilience, answering defense requirements from the outset.

Galileo operations and service provision, as well as that of the EU’s earth observation system, Copernicus, and the secure governmental communications service, GOVSATCOM, are overseen by EUSPA. The Agency’s Executive Director Rodrigo da Costa, said, “EUSPA ensures the safety and security of the EU space program and all its components, including assets in space and on the ground, and we provide services for governmental users,” such as the PRS and GOVSATCOM. “These are of fundamental importance for security stakeholders in the EU member states.” 

2022 will see significant progress toward the next PRS milestones, he said, “and we will be ramping up our activities to prepare the Galileo high-accuracy services for applications that require stringent levels of accuracy. Likewise, the navigation message authentication is currently undergoing a public test observation phase and this provides an innovative and unique feature to further strengthen service robustness and increasing the capability of detecting spoofing attacks.”

Once again, setting context and tone, Commissioner Breton said, “Space is a strategic place, where big powers are now competing, and we cannot be naive anymore. Galileo is the best satellite navigation system in the world. However, our competitors are moving fast. Europe must defend its interest and freedom to operate in space.”

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U.S. military efforts to field jam-resistant GPS weaponry not only run behind schedule, they continue to fall back, according to the annual report from the Department of Defense (DoD) Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) Nickolas Guertin. Because “the lack of M-code capable receivers limits the M-code use by U.S. and allied warfighters,” branches of the Armed Forces are now sourcing directly from commercial suppliers.

The OCX ground control system, destined to manage the GPS III constellation, and M-Code-enabled military GPS user equipment (MGUE) have yet to viably appear upon the scene, though the initially projected delivery dates for each have long since passed.

“Full control of modernized civil and M-code signals and navigation warfare functions, as well as improved cybersecurity, continue to be delayed due to ongoing development and deployment delays of the next generation Operational Control System (OCX), along with delays in the fielding of M-code capable receivers for use by the U.S. and allied warfighters.”

Continued delays of final software and hardware builds by MGUE Increment 1 vendors have impacted test schedules and created fears that, once finally produced and fielded, the equipment may incorporate obsolete components or be itself obsolete.

“Consequently, the Army and Marine Corps decided not to field their respective platforms with the ground-based MGUE Increment 1 card. . . . the Services have turned to commercially available, MGUE-derived M-code receivers to continue meeting PNT requirements. Those systems will undergo operational testing outside of the MGUE Increment 1 program of record.”

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The U.S. Air Force Guided Weapons Evaluation Facility ordered a BroadSim Wavefront advanced GNSS simulator from Orolia Defense & Security for weapons testing under electronic warfare — jamming — environments, among a wide range of other conditions.

The Broadsim Wavefront simulator will be integrated into a test environment for networked, collaborative and autonomous weapon systems developed under the Golden Horde program, designed to rapidly advance emerging weapons systems and warfighting concepts through prototype and experimentation.

The GWEF provides laboratory testing and simulation tools for developing precision-guided weapon technology, including a comprehensive scope of GPS/INS systems and integrated components like sensors, signals of opportunity and controlled reception pattern antennas. CRPAs are fundamental in many platforms due to their resistance to GPS jamming.

GWEF requirements included low-latency hardware-in-the-loop, automated calibration, and the flexibility to quickly integrate future signals. The BroadSim Wavefront will also be capable of testing eight-element CRPA systems, eight simultaneous Fixed Radiation Pattern Antenna (FRPA) systems, or a combination of CRPA and FRPA systems.

“Though the GWEF’s Wavefront unit contains eight nodes, corresponding to each antenna element),” said Tyler Hohman, director of products for Orolia Defense & Security, “it can be scaled from four to 16 antenna elements. Our continuous phase monitoring and compensation technique automatically monitors, aligns and adjusts the phase of each RF output continuously throughout the duration of a scenario.”

“Gone are the days of re-calibrating each frequency on your system, limiting your scenario duration or re-calibration every time you power cycle your system,” added Hohman. “Simply turn the system on, start the scenario, and your Wavefront system phase aligns and remains aligned for the entirety of the test.”

Leveraging the Skydel Simulation Engine, BroadSim Wavefront also supports high-dynamics, MNSA M-Code, alternative RF navigation, open-source IMU plug-in and 1000Hz iteration update rate. 

“Because of the software-defined architecture, many upgrades don’t require additional hardware, which has been a crucial advantage for customers who are already using this solution,” Hohman said.

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EMCORE Corporation, a provider of advanced mixed-signal products that serve the aerospace & defense, communications, and sensing markets, announced that it has entered into a definitive agreement to acquire the assets and liabilities of the L3Harris Space and Navigation Business for approximately $5 million in an all-cash transaction.

“L3Harris Space and Navigation designs and builds some of the most accurate Navigation products in the world. This acquisition expands our Fiber Optic Gyroscope (FOG) product portfolio into the Strategic Grade and Space-Qualified markets. We will also gain a technical team with a sterling track record of development and production of high-performance FOGs, Ring Laser Gyros (RLGs), and reaction wheels,” said Jeff Rittichier, President and CEO of EMCORE. “This acquisition further solidifies EMCORE’s position as one of the largest independent inertial navigation providers in the industry. This is an excellent fit strategically for EMCORE, bringing Space and Navigation’s strong brand, inertial technology, and important program wins. It also expands EMCORE’s market reach into launch vehicle and space satellite markets, both of which are seeing significant growth,” he added.

“The L3Harris Space and Navigation team will provide EMCORE with the capability to accelerate expansion into a true navigation-grade FOG business with superior performance and accuracy compared to competitors,” commented Albert Lu, Senior Vice President and General Manager, Aerospace and Defense for EMCORE. “Combining this business into EMCORE will allow us to provide customers with an expanded product suite that serves a broader range of requirements across both the tactical and navigation grade segments of the market.”

Highlights of the transaction are as follows:

• Expands EMCORE’s inertial navigation product portfolio and addressable market, accelerating growth and contributing additional revenue
• Includes Master Supply Agreements (MSAs) for the BoRG (Booster Rate Gyro) and TAIMU (Tri-Axial Inertial Measurement Unit) launch vehicle programs and creates partnership opportunities with L3Harris to expand our mutual business together
• EMCORE to be added as a preferred supplier to L3Harris divisions for future business opportunities
• Adds a complete set of capabilities to design and test for space applications
• Shock, vibration, and thermal shock measurement equipment
• X-ray capability and vacuum chambers
• Includes a large number of rate tables that can serve multiple product applications
• Expected to create material operating synergies in engineering, manufacturing, and sales
• Expected to be non-GAAP EPS accretive
Through the transaction, EMCORE will acquire all the intellectual property, and outstanding assets and liabilities of the L3Harris Space and Navigation business, including the 110,000 square foot leased production facility in Budd Lake, NJ. The consummation of the transaction is subject to customary closing conditions and is currently expected to close in the quarter ending June 30, 2022.

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Orbital Insight received a U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) contract to leverage commercially available data to identify intentional GNSS interference and manipulation, i.e. jamming and spoofing, operations across the world.

Orbital Insight’s platform will employ its multisensor data stack, artificial intelligence and machine learning capabilities to alert analysts and operators to potential jamming and spoofing events. The platform leverages a suite of geolocation data—satellite, AIS, ADS-B, and internet-of-things devices—along with new advanced algorithms designed to automatically recognize anomalies linked to spoofing, complemented by research intelligence from nonprofit partner Center for Advanced Defense Studies. 

“GNSS spoofing is essentially a data problem,” said Kevin O’Brien, CEO at Orbital Insight, “and our AI and deep data stack can help identify spoofing, along with other major humanitarian and environmental challenges.”

The technology has broad implications beyond situational awareness of intentional GNSS interference. Other national security, humanitarian and environmental challenges may be addressed, such as identifying drug trafficking, illegal fishing, sea-borne piracy and unintentional commercial aviation disruptions.

The National Air and Space Intelligence Center will be the first customer to utilize the technology. Upon successful integration, the goal will be to expand this platform widely across the defense, intelligence, and civil communities. 

Orbital Insight received the DoD contract on the heels of announcing a Phase II Small Business Innovation Research contract from the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to deliver a computer vision model that uses synthetic data to detect novel classes of objects. The company also recently launched a new class of multiclass object detection algorithms within its flagship GO platform to help the intelligence community monitor and differentiate activity at thousands of areas of interest.

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SBG Systems announced the tactical-grade Pulse-40 inertial measurement unit (IMU) in a miniaturized size for precision and robustness under harsh conditions, with an excellent size, weight, power and cost (SWAP-C) rating for its category.

The Pulse-40 is a 6 degrees-of-freedom, tactical grade IMU integrating micro-electromechanical systems (MEMS) three-axes accelerometers and gyroscopes in a unique redundant design that permits reducing system size while pushing performance level to the maximum.

Among the performance specifications, the Pulse-40 features excellent gyro and accelerometer bias instability of 0.8°/h and 6µg respectively, enabling long dead reckoning and maintaining excellent heading performance.
 
Thanks to a rigorous selection of sensors featuring extremely low vibration rectification error (VRE), the Pulse-40 can sustain high-vibration environments, up to 10g RMS. Data reliability during operation is also ensured by the embedded continuous built-in-test, enabled by redundant sensor integration. This functionality is a key parameter for critical applications. The Pulse-40 requires no periodic maintenance. An intensive qualification process including accelerated aging guarantees that the sensor behavior is stable over time.

The Pulse-40 comes with a 2-year warranty. It is export license-free and ITAR-free.
 
SBG Systems has a long-term history of designing quality MEMS-based inertial navigation systems (INS). Extensive research in signal processing, micro-electronics, calibration algorithms, and sensor qualification have won the company a reputation for accuracy and reliability since 2007. Its sensor calibration and validation tools, initially based on a single axis motion simulator with a temperature chamber, have evolved over the years and are now based on 100% automated, multi-axis motion simulators with temperature chambers. The high level of automation mitigates human error risk and ensures that all the delivered products meet their specifications.
 

SBG Systems is an ISO 9001:2015 certified company.
 

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